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1 Introduction 
1.1 Subject Matter  
 
This thesis deals with certain aspects concerning forced marriages in Norway, mostly 
from a legal point of view. In Norway today, forced marriages occur first and foremost 
among some groups of ethnic minorities in Norway. I have chosen to look at the 
Pakistani population in Norway, as they are the largest minority group, and they also 
have the highest percentage of persons seeking help against forced marriages.1 
 
Arriving at a clear definition of forced marriages is difficult. Not much attention has 
been paid to where exactly to draw the line between unlawful compulsion on the one 
hand, and pressure one is legally allowed to exercise on the other, neither in 
international human rights discourse nor in national theory. In my opinion, this is partly 
due to conflicting views on what constitutes compulsion with regard to marriage, and 
partly because the subjective element of the victim is central. In the following I will 
argue in favour of a flexible, differentiated concept of forced marriage as long as one 
upholds the starting point that compulsion is prohibited. 
 
Although I have a legal focus in my thesis, I have had to look beyond laws and 
regulations. The debate on the universality of human rights and or the relativist 
conception combined with the quest for multiculturalism is important in order to place 
the practice of forced marriages in a context. Forced marriages are a cultural 
phenomenon and one need to have at least some knowledge of the cultural mechanisms 
involved in order to decide what measures to apply in the fight against it. It is 
furthermore my opinion that laws and regulations alone cannot end this practice as there 
are so many different mechanisms causing its survival. 
                                                 
1 For statistical data, see point 1.1.3 below 
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My aim with this thesis is to provide a brief overview of international instruments 
concerning forced marriages, what substantial obligations one can deduct from the 
instruments and to show how these may provide certain guidelines in the struggle to 
combat forced marriages in Norway.   
 
Forced marriage is a crime that takes place in the private sphere. Traditionally states 
have been unwilling to interfere in such matters. One has also seen that states have been 
restrictive when it comes to interfering where religion (or practices that appear to be 
religious) and culture come into play. I will describe the ongoing debate concerning 
multiculturalism and try to suggest a couple of possible the measures that may be taken. 
My starting point is that culture should not serve as an excuse for upholding clearly 
damaging practices, and furthermore, in the case of forced marriage, that there is no 
religious support for the practice either. An obligation for the state to interfere is also 
established.  
 
I will then give an overview of legal provisions in Norway relevant to forced marriages, 
and try to establish at least to some extent the content of the term forced marriage in 
relation to legislation. Furthermore, I will look at opportunities to improve the 
legislation in order to make it more effective in the work against such marriages. 
 
As many excuse forced marriages as a religious phenomenon, I will furthermore look at 
Islam in order to find out what the religion really says about forced marriages. I will 
argue that it is important to combine the application of legal measures directly 
forbidding forced marriages with the working from within the culture to change this 
practice.   
 
1.1.1 Background 
During the 1990’s, there was a growing awareness in Norway of the problem of forced 
marriages in some minority cultures. In 1995, a plan of action aiming to improve the 
integration, equality and overall situation of children and youth with minority 
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background, addressed the issue of forced marriages.2 The media has also contributed to 
the increased focus on the problem by communicating the heart-breaking stories of 
many a victim of forced marriages. The Norwegian Parliament requested in the autumn 
of 1997 a plan of action devoted solely to the issue of forced marriages, and the 
Norwegian Government adopted a three-year plan of action in December 19983. 
Through this action plan, the government signalled that forced marriages are 
unacceptable in Norway.  
 
1.1.2 Forced Marriages in Numbers 
There are not any statistics available on how many forced marriages are conducted in 
Norway (or with people resident in Norway).According to the statistics Oslo Red Cross 
International Centre (ORKIS) has presented in its annual report on callers to its 
information-line on forced marriages in Norway, 193 contacted the centre in connection 
with real threats of forced marriage in 2001. In 2002, 323 contacted the centre. This 
equals an annual increase of about 60%. Statistics from the organisation Self-help for 
Immigrants and Refugees (SEIF) show that 373 contacted the centre in 2001 concerning 
arranged marriages with various degrees of compulsion. The corresponding number for 
2002 is 468, which equals an increase of 25%.4 Whether this is just the ‘tip of the 
iceberg’ and that there really has been an acceleration in forced marriages, or that it is 
the increased focus on the problem that has made more people seek help, is difficult to 
say.  Bredal points to the fact that it is impossible to establish the extent of the problem, 
                                                 
2 Handlingsplan mot tvangsekteskap (‘Plan of Action against Forced Marriages’),foreword.Found at 
internet (14.06.03): http://odin.dep.no/bfd/norsk/publ/handlingsplaner/004021-990047/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
3 Handlingsplan mot tvangsekteskap (‘Plan of Action against Forced Marriages’). 
4 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion paper): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 annet, 
tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development. Found at internet(14.06.03): 
http://www.odin.dep.no/krd/norsk/aktuelt/p10000282/p10000283/016081-080016/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
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both because cases will not always be reported, but also because it is hard to define 
what constitutes a forced marriage.5 
 
1.1.3 Forced Marriages among Norwegian-Pakistanis 
The Pakistanis are the largest group of immigrants in Norway (19 400 in 1997, of whom 
11800 are 1st generation and 7.600 2nd generation immigrants)6 and in addition to this, 
they seem to be in a majority in statistics on the number of persons seeking help against 
forced marriages.7 According to the statistics ORKIS made on callers to the 
information-line, 31,4% of the callers were Pakistani in 2000. This was with a wide 
margin the largest percentage for any immigrant group.8 Indications of a high 
percentage of forced marriages are also the fact that the average age of marriage for 
Pakistani women is low (21 years old) and that most of them marry persons who have 
grown up in Pakistan, although many young people state that they would prefer to 
marry another Norwegian-Pakistani instead. 9  
 
1.2 Demarcations and Starting Points of the Thesis 
First of all I would like to point out a few basis premises regarding this thesis, as these 
conditions are essential for my line of argument. My ethical starting point is – as I 
mentioned above – that forced marriages are wrong. The very concept of forced 
marriages - that someone forces a person into a marriage against his or her own will - 
crashes violently with the notion that all individuals are born ‘free and equal in dignity 
and rights’ as stated in art.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and can 
therefore never be accepted.  This is hardly a controversial point of view, as no religion 
                                                 
5 Fangen, 2002, p.36 
6 Vassenden, 1997, p.39 
7 Report from a study trip made by Norwegian representatives from Oslo Red Cross International Centre, 
Oslo Police District, the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs and the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration from the 6th to the 19th of December, p.3 
8 Fangen, 2002, p.38 
9 Fangen, 2002, p. 39 with reference to Bredal (1998) 
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restricts choice.10  In fact, most of them prohibit forced marriages directly and I will 
later show that there exists a variety of protection clauses against forced marriages in 
international human rights law. 
 
One has to distinguish between arranged and forced marriages. At this point in my 
thesis suffice to define arranged marriages as marriages where someone else (normally a 
family member) finds the intended groom or bride a spouse, but where the groom/bride 
has the possibility to refuse the suggested spouse. Exactly when an arranged marriage 
crosses the line and becomes force is difficult to say. A definition of what constitutes a 
forced marriages that is often referred to is the one from the Working Group on forced 
marriages established by the British Home Office (the Working Group): ‘[I]t is a 
marriage conducted without the valid consent of both parties, where duress is a 
factor.’11  
 
Both men and women are victims of forced marriages. In my thesis I have chosen to 
focus on the situation of women. One reason is that it is customary for the wife to move 
in with the husband’s family, so that the consequences normally are greater for the 
woman than for the man. Expectations of behaviour due to the concept of honour are 
also bigger and more restraining to the every day life of women than to that of men. 
Furthermore the situation for the man and the woman will often be so different that it 
would extend the limits of my thesis to have a ‘double focus’.  Forced marriages have 
been described as a problem of violence against women. It also seems that mostly 
women are affected. (see point 2.1) However, the legal protection, and the other 
measures taken to prevent these marriages, are gender neutral, and will often give the 
same result for both male and female victims. My discussion will therefore mostly 
apply to victims of both sexes.  
 
I have chosen not to treat child marriages in this thesis. Such marriages raise a whole set 
of other problems, in addition to the ones we see in connection with the forcing of an 
                                                 
10 Working Group, in Foreword 
11 Working Group, p.6 
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adult into marriage. Child marriages will almost always be forced, and it would be next 
to impossible to draw the line between the forced and the arranged marriages. Children 
would, even if they were to accept the marriage, not have the insight and knowledge to 
understand what they agreed to. The definition of a child in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (the CRC) is a ‘human being below the age of eighteen years’12, 
unless majority is attained earlier under the law that is applicable to the child. I chose to 
use the same definition, and do not look at forced marriages when one or both of the 
victims are under the age of majority.  
 
I furthermore exclude from my discussion the trafficking with women. Although 
trafficking with women may also take form of forced marriage, the circumstances are 
often different. The typical forced marriage situation is more a question of controlling 
female sexuality while trafficking involves the sexual exploitation of women for 
commercial purposes.  
 
1.3 Methodology and sources 
As my thesis is situated somewhere in between legal science and 
sociology/anthropology I have used a number of sources in this thesis. I have used 
traditional legal texts and its sources, such as travaux préparatoires, case law and legal 
theory in order to establish the normative contents of the Norwegian laws and 
regulation. In describing international law, I have made use of treaties, soft law an 
international legal theory. The use of sources in connection with these two parts has 
been traditional legal interpretation. When it comes to the part on Pakistani legislation 
and Islamic law, I had to resort to using secondary sources for a large part. It took a lot 
of time and effort to understand the peculiarities of a religious law compared to the 
secular legislation I have been used to interpret. In order to understand the mechanisms 
working together and upholding a practice like forced marriages, and to get insight in 
the different opinions concerning practices as these, I had to read and learn how to make 
                                                 
12 CRC article 1. THE CEDAW Committee recommends that this shall be the minimum age for marriage 
for the State Parties, se point  2.1.5 
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use of sociological and anthropological sources. The process of gaining perspective and 
trying to see the legislation in its context in society has been both informative and very 
interesting. 
2 Forced and Arranged Marriages – a Brief Overview 
A marriage can serve a multiple of purposes, ranging from forming a union between 
two people who love each other to being a practical arrangement in order to provide 
financial security or connections. In between we can find the wish to weld together two 
families or two branches of a family. Although forced marriages derives from and 
occurs in the cultures that practice arranged marriages, it is common to separate the two. 
The conception of arranged marriages has been a subject of controversy, as some think 
that all arranged marriages are de facto forced marriages (operating with the notion of 
“false consciousness”), whereas others distinguish sharply between the two forms of 
marriages.  SEIF states in their emergency-guide that arranged marriages can be called a 
tradition of compulsion because saying no to a marriage can lead to pressure from the 
family and the surroundings.13 I support the view of amongst other the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Violence ( the Spec. Rapp.), stating that forced marriages ‘must 
be distinguished from arranged marriages, which operate successfully within many 
communities.14 Arranged marriages are common in large parts of the world, legal and 
not regarded to be in contravention with human rights.  
 
How to draw the line between the two different types of marriage, however, is quite 
difficult. The ordinary definition of an arranged marriage, is that the bride/groom of full 
and free consent marries a person someone else (normally his/hers parents) have 
suggested. The element of choice – the person has a right to reject the parents’ 
suggestion(s) concerning a spouse at any time - is emphasised, and it is this element that 
                                                 
13 Storhaug, Hege: ’Tvangsekteskap-en kriseguide’.Found at internet (15.06.03): 
http://www.seif.no/tvangsekteskap/kriseguide/index.html#01 
14 Spec. Rapp, point 57, p.19 
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separates arranged marriages from the forced ones. In a forced marriage, as previously 
mentioned, the element of choice and consent will lack, as the parents will not suggest a 
spouse for their daughter, but simply choose one, and force her to marry him. 
  
The distinction can be hard to draw from case to case. What constitute a 100% free and 
full consent is hard to establish. How much the pressure from the parents influenced the 
woman’s ‘choice’, the same. Questions can be raised as to whether the parents really 
used force in order to complete the marriage – or if the woman who felt compelled was 
just overly sensitive. Was the opportunity to say no actual, or was it just a theoretical 
opportunity? 
 
Organisations seeking to help the victims of forced marriages/preventing them from 
happening, often say that the starting point has to be the subjective experience of the 
victim herself.15 If he/she felt forced at the time, the marriage was not constituted with 
full and free consent. This subjective approach is useful when it comes to dealing with 
the victims, but can prove to be less useful when it comes to operating within a legal 
framework. The principle of the foreseeability of legal provisions requires that it, at 
least in the field of criminal law, has to be established a lower boundary for what 
constitutes compulsion. The need for foreseeability is not as apparent in other areas, for 
instance when it comes to the annulment of a forced marriage. But still, a legal system 
cannot be based solely on subjective perceptions, one need to have at least some 
objective criteria. I will come back to this under the discussion of Norwegian 
legislation, point 6.1 below. 
 
2.1 Violence against Women 
Forced marriages are part of the larger problem of violence against women. The 
Working Group is of the opinion that, although men also are affected, forced marriage 
must be seen primarily as an issue of violence against women. Their consultations show 
that the percentage of women subjected to forced marriage is higher, and that it is 
                                                 
15 Working Group, p. 18  
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women who most often live in fear and suffer violence as a result of forced marriage.16 
The British Embassy in Islamabad had 180 cases of forced marriage in 2001. 25% 
concerned boys.17  The effects are furthermore likely to be greater for girls. The Spec. 
Rapp supports the view that forced marriage primarily must be seen as an issue of 
violence against women.18 
2.2 Reasons behind Forced Marriages 
Islam regards marriage as a civil contract, and a marriage is looked upon as an 
agreement between two families rather than two individuals in love. Up until the last 
100 years or so, this was the common view in most Western countries, as well.19 The 
family unit plays a larger role in Islamic societies (and in most other non-Western 
communities for that matter) –and as one is expected to provide for one’s family when 
necessary it is only natural that a number of different reasons come into consideration 
when choosing a spouse. The arrangement of marriages forms a complex web of 
economic, social and political factors and can also be a reflection of existing power 
relations. One of the arguments for arranged marriages is that since the spouse becomes 
an integrated part of an extended family it is important to consider how well the spouse 
will fit in. And who is better to evaluate this than the family, especially since there 
normally is very little contact between single people of opposite sexes. It is in these 
cases hard for the young person to form a qualified opinion on the suitability of a 
possible spouse on his or her own.  
 
The segregation of the sexes is seen as desirable as Islam does not accept sexuality and 
impropriety outside of marriage. In the Saima Waheed case (which I will return to 
shortly) the dissenting judge argued that if a woman was to use her independent choice 
                                                 
16 Working Group, p.11 
17 Report, Study Trip, p.10 
18 Spec. Rapp, point 57, p.19 
 
19 For a brief overview on the history of forced marriages practiced previously in Norway:Hennum/Paul, 
p. 22-23 
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of entering into a contract of marriage, the only way in which she could make such a 
choice was by ‘freely mixing with males and then selecting one of them as her future 
husband. This way of life is neither permitted nor encouraged by any fiqh or school of 
thought because it is against basic teachings of Islam that people from both sexes should 
have free access to each other’.20 
 
Women are forced into marriage for a number of reasons. Strengthening family links 
(often combined with pressure from the family or long-standing family commitments),  
protecting perceived cultural and religious ideals, preventing ‘unsuitable’ relationships 
(the girl gets a boyfriend the parents do not condone of) are –in addition to protection of 
family honour and controlling female behaviour and sexuality-some of the reasons why 
parents force their children into marriage. 
 
Honour –and the importance of being honourable- also plays an important part in the 
identity building of families in minority cultures in industrialised countries. People who 
are deemed to have lost their honour, lose respect and prestige in the minority group. 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Honour 
The concept of honour holds a strong position in many Muslim communities. Female 
members of the family are seen to embody the honour of male members, and the family 
status in these patriarchal societies depends on honour. The women must protect their 
virginity and chastity. The Spec. Rapp states that ‘what masquerades as “honour” is 
really men’s need to control women’s sexuality and their freedom’.21 As marriage also 
is a mean of controlling sexuality (marriage is regarded as an important safeguard of 
chastity22 in Islam), the link between them is evident. The concept of honour is a 
powerful tool that has brought about many forms of violence, including the compelling 
                                                 
20 Abduhl Waheed v Asma Jahangir, PLD 1997 Lahore 331 
21 Spec. Rapp., point 27, p.13 
22 Espositon, John (1982), p.15 
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of women into marriage. The number of ‘honour killings’ is on the rise world wide, and 
one sees that the perception of what constitutes honour and what damages is widening.23 
 
For women wishing to protest against a forced marriage, or wishing to marry a spouse 
of their own free choice, the threat of honour killing will often linger in the background. 
Women who choose their own husbands are seen as transgressors of the boundaries of 
appropriate sexual behaviour. The Spec. Rapp states that forced marriages are ‘forms of 
direct abuse that regulate female sexuality’.24 
 
The element of free consent can easily be obscured when there are so many powerful 
factors at play. Economic reasons combined and interlinked with considerations of 
honour and family connections create an enormous pressure–both towards the intended 
spouse who has a duty to provide for its family and towards the branch of the family in 
the industrial country to show solidarity with their relatives in the home country- 
especially so when it is customary and desirable to arrange marriages between cousins. 
The family ties are obviously stronger then, and it will be harder to decline a suggested 
marriage candidate, as the consequences of such an insult will be bigger. It can also go 
the other way, in that the immigrated family wishes to find a good honourable spouse 
from the home country.  
 
For a young person presented with all these arguments the possibility of declining a 
suggested marriage can appear to be less than none. The parents may loose face or be 
denied the possibility of a better life through their children and the youth may loose 
contact with his or her family if declining –or even worse. Where to draw the line 
between a forced marriage and a marriage entered into after reasonable consideration of 
the consequences of refusal is in these cases very hard. The youth may in either case 
look for a way out that does not compromise him/her and his/her family (see my 
discussion of the legislation in Norway chapter 6) 
                                                 
23 Spec. Rapp., point 28, p.13 For more regarding honour and honour killings (the murder of a woman to 
restore the family’s honour), see the Spec. Rapp. p.11-15 
24 Spec. Rapp,, point 103, p.29 
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2.3 Reasons in Relevance to the Pakistani Community in Norway 
The majority of Pakistani immigrants in Norway come from a district in Punjab that is 
called ‘Little Norway’. The villages in this district are very poor, and the illiteracy rate 
is higher here than in the rest of Pakistan (some statistics indicate that the numbers are 
up to 80%25). The population here practice something they refer to as ‘strict Islam’ that 
in fact is a continuation of old traditions and customs, many of which is contrary to 
Islam.26  
 
In Norway, most of the marriages of the Pakistani population are between a Norwegian-
Pakistani and a person from Pakistan. In the period 1987-1995, 69% of the men and 
71% of the women found their spouses abroad.27 Among Pakistanis in Norway 80% of 
the marriages are between cousins. This percentage is higher than the one in Pakistan.28 
Terje Bjøranger from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration suspects that 
transnational forced marriages are increasingly economically motivated.29 The 
difference between the families that have relatives in the West and those who do not, is 
enormous.30 Since family ties are strong in Pakistan, and it is customary for cousins to 
marry each other, family pressure often constitutes a large part of the motivation.31 
 
The practice not to marry another immigrant is a practice that ensures that the close ties 
between the immigrants and their country of origin, particularly with the relatives in 
said country, are upheld. It is also a means to increasing wealth in the country of origin. 
Most of the Pakistani population is very poor and –as families have a duty to look after 
its members- it is a huge advantage to have a relative in an industrial country such as 
Norway that can send back money. As it is customary for cousins to enter such an 
                                                 
25 Report, study trip, p.6 
26 Report, study trip, p.18 
27 Bredal, (1998), p.5 with further references 
28 Report, study trip 
29 Conversation with Mr. Bjøranger 13.06.03 
30 See Report, study trip regarding the differences in ‘Little Norway’ in Punjab. 
31 Working Group, p.14 
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alliance and the pressure from the part of the family still situated in Pakistan – and with 
an eligible cousin- is often very strong on the ‘Norwegian branch’ of the family, since 
the wealth of the family is at stake. The aspect of honour comes into consideration here 
–being used for all it is worth- and strong forces are at play, making it even harder for 
the youths to resist a ‘suitable’ marriage. Marriages across borders are valuable entrance 
passes to an industrialised country and thus ‘big business’. 
3 Protection against Forced Marriages in International Law 
There are several international instruments which are relevant to the discussion on 
forced marriages. As far as the position of women is concerned, the United Nations 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the 
CEDAW) is of the utmost importance. The CEDAW Committee has been very active in 
its addressing of forced marriages and issues related to forced marriages, and this 
provides useful information when interpreting the rights deriving from the convention. 
But there are also other conventions regulating questions relating to forced marriages of 
both sexes. I will start by giving an overview of these (in that sense more general) 
conventions before concentrating on the rights embedded in the CEDAW. I will then 
look at other human rights embedded in various conventions that may be violated 
through a forced marriage. 
 
It is important to have a human rights perspective when discussing the problem of 
forced marriages, as these human rights can create obligations for the states and through 
that ensure that individuals are protected against forced marriages on a national level. It 
is also possible that the states may be held responsible for failure to prevent 
international human rights, even if the violations are committed by private, non-state 
actors. I will address those questions after my overview of different human rights 
protecting individuals against forced marriages. 
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3.1 Interpretation of Treaties 
 
International treaty language may be vague and general. This can give rise to problems 
when one is to establish the exact content of the treaties. The vagueness and generalness 
are often deliberate, as a result of compromise between diverging political and moral 
viewpoints and due to the fact that the states often do not wish to give up too much of 
their sovereignty by taking on obligations which are too precise.  The tendency to 
establish rights for individuals through conventions that can be enforced by courts of 
law has increased, at least in the area of human rights, but it is still difficult to deduce 
specific rights and obligations from the treaties.  
 
An interpretation of the treaty text is necessary in order to establish its content. This 
would be the situation with all legal texts, but the need is particularly urdent when the 
texts are as vague and general as they are in international treaties. The sources of law 
and rules for interpretation frequently differ from what one sees in the national 
jurisprudence. The states have agreed upon the rules for interpretation and the relevant 
sources of law. These principles are set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties articles 31-33.32 The principles concerning interpretation have been regarded 
by the International Court of Justice as a codification of customary international law33, 
but the principles outlined in the treaty are not exhaustive.34  
 
It is the wording of the treaty that is the natural starting point when interpreting treaties, 
as it is the treaty text the parties have agreed upon, cf. article 31. The interpretation must 
be carried out in good faith, the wording must be seen in context, and the object and the 
purpose of the treaty may shed light on the interpretation. The preamble of the treaty 
provided guidance when it comes to establishing the object and purpose of the treaty.  
 
                                                 
32 For more information regarding treaty interpretation, see for instance:  Ruud, Morten, Ulfstein (2002), 
p. 69-76 
33 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, ICJ Rep. 1991, p.53 on p. 70. 
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In the interpretation of human rights documents, a principle of efficiency has developed. 
This means that one is to choose the interpretation that best ensures an efficient 
implementation of the treaty. It is furthermore argued that public international law, 
especially in the area of human rights has to depend on a dynamic interpretation in order 
to keep up with developments in society.35  The principle of efficiency combined with a 
dynamic interpretation can provide a useful tool when interpreting human rights treaties 
and establishing the obligations of the State Parties with regard to the treaties. 
 
The issue of forced marriages and violence against women has also been dealt with in 
‘soft law’-sources, i.e. documents that are not legally binding, such as the Declaration 
against Violence and the report of the Spec. Rapp. The CEDAW Committee has made 
general recommendations pursuant to article 21 of the CEDAW. Formally speaking, 
these interpretations of the conventions are not legally binding, but they are relevant to 
the understanding of the CEDAW. For Norwegian authorities, who have a responsibility 
to ‘respect and ensure human rights’ pursuant to the Constitution section 110 c36 
recommendations from human rights instruments will be of relevance, particularly in 
the cases where the CEDAW Committee establishes how the Convention is to be 
interpreted. 
 
3.2 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
It is natural to take the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as a starting point when 
one is to examine general human rights’ protection against forced marriages, as this is 
the first human rights instrument to be proclaimed by a global international 
organisation. (Buergenthal states that it ranks ‘as a milestone in mankind’s struggle for 
freedom and human dignity’37). 
                                                                                                                                               
34  Ruud, Ulfstein, Fauchald (1997), p. 61 
35Ruud, Ulfstein, Fauchald (1997),  p.62 
36 Unofficial translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found on the internet (14.06.03): 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
37 Buergenthal (2002) 
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The UN Charter (the Charter) itself states in article 1.3 that one of the purposes of the 
United Nations is to promote and encourage “respect for human rights”, but does not go 
any further in describing what those human rights actually consist of. 
 
The Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Over the years, the 
Declaration won worldwide recognition, and now serves as a symbol of what the 
international community means by ‘human rights’.  Although it is not a treaty and 
therefore is not legally binding as such, there is today widespread agreement concerning 
the fact that the Declaration is a normative instrument reflecting at least some legal 
obligations for the Member States of the UN, as it is seen as the interpretation of the 
human rights obligations contained in the Charter.38  The UN Human Rights Conference 
in Teheran in 1968 issued a proclamation saying that the Declaration ‘constitutes an 
obligation for the members of the international community’39, and this was repeated at a 
similar conference in Vienna in 1993. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also 
used the proclamation in its line of argument.40  
 
Article 16 in the Declaration proclaims the right to marriage and family. Subparagraph 2 
states that marriage ‘shall only be entered into with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses’, and thus rules out forced marriages, as such marriages will lack the 
free and full consent of at least one of the intending spouses.  
 
3.3 The International Covenants on Human Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCP) and The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) constitute together with the 
                                                 
38 Buergenthal (2002)  
39 ‘The Proclamation of Teheran’, 13th of May, 1968 
40 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) 
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Declaration what is normally referred to as the international Bill of Human Rights. The 
Covenants were based on the human rights catalogue set forth in the Declaration. 
 The covenants are treaties, and therefore create binding legal obligations for the State 
Parties. This carries the implication that issues relating to compliance with and the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Covenants are matters of international 
concern, and not only exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. 
 
 
3.3.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The ICCP uses almost the same wording as the Declaration in its discussion of 
marriage: ‘No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses’, see art. 23(3). Again we find that a ‘free and full consent’ is an 
obligatory condition of a marriage which is consistent with international human rights. 
 
3.3.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
In the ICESC we find the protection against forced marriages in art. 10(1), linked to the 
State Parties’ recognition of the fact that ‘the widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family, (…) particularly for its establishment’ (art. 10(1), first 
sentence). Even if the State Parties are responsible for protecting the establishment of 
families, it does not accept forced marriages, as ‘marriages must be entered into with the 
free consent of the intending spouses’ (art. 10(1) i.f.). 
 
The condition stipulated for a marriage to be acceptable in human rights terms by the 
ICESC, is simply a ‘free consent’, but this cannot be said to de facto constitute a 
difference from the ICCPR and the Declaration, as it is not likely that a consent which is 
not ‘full’ can be said to be ‘free’. Neither is it likely that it was intentional to establish 
two different contents of the right to freedom from force in relation to marriage with the 
two different wordings. 
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3.4 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages 
The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages (The Marriage Convention) entered into force 9th of December 1964. The 
49 State Parties to this convention includes Norway, but not Pakistan. 
 
The preamble refers to art. 16 of the Declaration, and to General Assembly resolution 
843(IX), in which ‘certain customs, ancient laws and practices relating to marriages (…) 
were inconsistent with the principles’ in the Charter and the Declaration. The preamble 
further states that the State Parties ‘should take all appropriate measures with a view to 
abolishing such customs, ancient laws and practices by ensuring (…) complete freedom 
in the choice of a spouse’. 
 
Article 1 in the Marriage Convention expands the notion of what constitutes ‘valid’ 
marriage in relation to the international bill of rights. Not only must the consent be full 
and free, the consent is also ‘to be expressed by (…) [the intending spouses] in person 
after due publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnise the 
marriage and of witnesses’. For the cases of forced marriages, however, it is the free and 
full consent that is relevant. 
 
3.5 The CEDAW 
The Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was 
adopted on the 18th of December 1979 and entered into force on the 3rd of September 
1981 after 20 countries had ratified it (pursuant to article 27(1) in the Convention). 
There are now 169 state parties to the Convention (spring 2002).   
 
The CEDAW is an instrument addressing discrimination of women, and therefore will 
discrimination against a man falls outside the scope of the Convention (see art. 1). The 
CEDAW is quite extensive and progressive as human rights convention go. The 
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preamble is far-reaching in its referrals to “the new international economic order based 
on equity and justice”, and the convention breaks down the traditional dichotomy 
between the private and the public sphere. It has been a common notion in human rights 
law that the states are not to interfere with its citizens’ ways of organising their private 
life, but the CEDAW observes no such division. The preamble states that “a change in 
the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is 
needed to achieve full equality” (my stress), and article 16 goes a long way in ensuring 
equality ‘in all matters relating to marriage and family’. 
 
The substantive rights of the convention consist of a combination of the so-called 1st, 
2nd and 3rd generation rights, and thus provide a whole range of rights aimed at 
improving the position of women. It has been customary to divide the substantive 
human rights into three generations after when they first won recognition on an 
international level. The 1st generation, the civil and political rights, are rights protecting 
the individuals from infringements by the state. The 2nd generation rights are the social, 
economic and cultural right and these impose a duty on the state to take active action in 
order to ensure the rights. The 3rd generation of rights is a recent development and deals 
with collective right. The division into generations does not make a hierarchy of rights. 
The position of the UN has from the adoption of the Universal Declaration always been 
that the human rights are ‘universal and indivisible’ –although there is an ongoing 
discussion as to whether one can give many of the solidarity and collective rights 
belonging to the 3rd generation status of human rights (see the debate on 
multiculturalism in chapter 5 below). 
 
The CEDAW protects civil and political rights (1st generation) for women such as the 
right to equality before the law (art. 15.1) and the right to vote (art. 7 litra a), and it 
protects economic, social and cultural rights (2nd generation), like the right to work (art. 
11.1 litra a), the right to access to health care services (art. 12.1) and the right to 
participate in all aspects of cultural life (art. 13 litra c). The CEDAW also provides 
collective/solidarity rights (3rd generation), in its particular protection of rural women 
(art.14).  
 
  20 
3.5.1 Equality in the Family –Article 16 
Article 16 of the CEDAW gives –as mentioned above- the State Parties an obligation to 
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations. This article, combined with article 2 and article 5, obliges the State Parties to 
take all appropriate measures to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct so that 
equality will be ensured in all parts of society and life.  Article 16 is controversial, and it 
is the article which holds the most reservations by State Parties to the Convention, as it 
goes straight to the core of the private life of individuals. The article is seen as a 
breakthrough in international law’s recognition of women’s individual rights in the 
private sphere.  
 
Neither Norway nor Pakistan made any reservations to article 16, but Pakistan made a 
declaration when ratifying the CEDAW in 1996, that said that: ‘The accession by the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the said Convention is subject to the 
provision of the Constitution of Pakistan’. As I will come back to further down, the 
Pakistan Constitution lays down that Pakistan is a Muslim State. Although not 
specifically aimed at article 16, it is clear that a statement like this, giving Islamic law 
precedence over the CEDAW is particularly problematic when it comes to ensuring 
equality between man and women within the family. The Qur’an states for instance that 
the man shall be head of the family, and the Islamic tradition propounds the doctrine of 
equal worth and equal dignity rather than using the phrase ‘equality for men and 
women’. 
 
Article 16 refers to matters concerning the entering into marriage in several provisions. 
Article 16.1.a states that men and women shall have the ‘same right to enter into 
marriage’, and article 16.2.states that the ‘betrothal and marriage of a child shall have 
no legal effect’. Paragraph 2 also instructs the State Parties to specify a minimum age 
for marriage.  In General Recommendation 21 the CEDAW Committee recommends, 
with reference to the CRC, that the minimum age shall be set to 18 years of age. 
 
Article 16.1.b stipulates that one shall have the right to ‘freely (…) choose a spouse and 
to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent’. This implies two things: 
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Firstly, that man and woman shall be equal also when it comes to this matter, and 
secondly –which is the most relevant in this case – that the entering into a marriage 
always shall be free from coercion. According to Thorbjørnsrud,41 it is possible to 
separate between three levels of self-determination in relation to arranged marriages: 1) 
The daughter’s right to give or withhold her free consent, 2) her right to choose for 
herself someone their parents can accept, and 3) her right to choose a partner that the 
parents do not accept. A violation of number 1 will constitute forced marriage, and an 
infringement on the right to marry only after giving your free and full consent. 
Violations of number 2 and 3 will constitute an infringement on the right to freely 
choose a spouse and the right to marry. 
 
3.5.2 Recommendations by the CEDAW Committee 
The CEDAW Committee addresses in General Recommendation No. 2142 the right of 
women to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage, and describes this as ‘central 
to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being’. The Committee stresses 
that ‘a woman’s right to choose when, if and whom she will marry’ shall only be subject 
to reasonable restriction such as a minimum age requirement or a prohibition of 
marrying close relatives.  
 
The CEDAW Committee points out that although most of the countries report that their 
national constitutions and laws comply with the Convention on this matter, custom, 
tradition and failure to enforce the laws given, in reality makes a contravention to the 
CEDAW. The statements made by the Committee take us to the core of the discussion 
about state responsibility, which I will come back to later in chapter 4. 
 
General Recommendation No.19 concerning violence is also of relevance in forced 
marriage cases. The Committee states that ‘[g]ender-based violence is a form of 
                                                 
41 Fangen, p.35 
42 General Recommendation No. 21 (13th session, 1994) made by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 
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discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a 
basis of equality with men’. 43  
3.6 Other human rights relevant to the protection against forced marriages 
A victim of a forced marriage will not only find that the specific right to freely choose a 
spouse is violated, and the right to marry (also protected in the European Convention on 
Human Right article 12), she will also experience an infringement of other human 
rights. Being forced into marriage may constitute a violation of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health pursuant to ICESC article 12. Her liberty of 
movement (ICCP art. 12) may be restricted, so may her right to liberty and security and 
to freedom from arbitrary detention subsequent to ICCP article 9 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) article 5. In gross cases, we can also talk about 
violation of right to prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (ICCP 
art.7, ECHR art.3) and the right to life (ICCP art.6, ECHR art.2). She should also be 
free from gender-based discrimination, cf. art 2 of ICCP and ICESC and ECHR art. 14. 
Female victims of violence such as forced marriages have the same right to enforcement 
and protection of the law as those belonging to other victims of violence. Hence, 
women’s right to equal protection of the law is violated if the state concerned fails to 
ensure these rights to women subjected to or threatened by forced marriage on the same 
basis as other victims of violence. Also, as forced marriage constitutes a form of 
violence against women it results in a direct violation of human rights, cf. article 4 of 
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. 
 
The more extreme cases may also e constitute acts of ‘slavery-like practices’ (cf. the 
Declaration art. 4, ICCP art. 8 and ECHR art.4) which have been described as including 
practices whereby ‘a woman without the right to refuse, is promised or given in 
marriage’ (cf. art. 1 of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery) –although this definition 
resembles the situation of trafficking more than the situation of forced marriages. 
                                                 
43 General Recommendation No. 19 (11th session, 1992) made by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, point 1. 
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4 State Responsibility for Protection According to International Law 
Once a state has ratified a convention, and thus become a State Party, the state will be 
legally bound to obey the convention, and follow through on the substantive obligations 
given in said convention. In traditional international law the states that are the legal 
subjects, and this is still the main rule. One has also opened for the possibility that 
individuals may be legal subjects, at least in the way that they may be the beneficiary of 
rights. When it comes to obligations, it is still –internationally- the states that are held 
responsible for international wrongful acts. Exceptions may be found when it comes to 
gross violation of human rights. The recent establishing of the International Criminal 
Court (the ICC) is a good example of this. The ICC prosecutes individuals accused of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
  
State responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law. It provides that a 
state is legally accountable for breaches of its obligations under customary international 
or treaty law that are attributable or imputable to the state. The principle also lays down 
the conditions for when a state shall be seen accountable for an international wrong. 
These rules of responsibility are largely based on customary international law as it has 
transpired from state and case practice. The International Law Commission (the ILC) of 
the UN has since 1994 worked with the codification and development of the rules of 
state responsibility, and has now come up with a set of draft articles on the 
responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts that the General Assembly took 
note of in Resolution 56/83 of January 28th 2002. The draft articles are annexed to the 
Resolution.44 These draft articles provide a general overview of the content of the 
customary international law of state responsibility, although they have not yet been 
formally adopted, and therefore are not legally binding as such. 
 
The starting point is that a state is responsible for all actions and omissions by state 
organs, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive or judicial powers (cf. draft 
article 4) as long as the conduct is attributable to the state under international law and 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state (cf. draft article 2). 
                                                 
44  The Draft Articles, found at internet: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm 
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 The international law of state responsibility for human rights violations has in recent 
times evolved from its traditional starting point. There are now numerous states that are 
members of multilateral human rights conventions, and this has enhanced the prospects 
of enforcing state responsibility.  Forced marriages are often conducted by the family of 
the victim –or at least by individuals, and it is difficult to think of an example where the 
state will be the direct perpetrator. However, this does not mean that states have no 
responsibility when an individual has gotten her human right violated and a forced 
marriage has been conducted. 
 
Acts on the part of private persons that violate an individual’s right not to be forced into 
a marriage do not necessarily implicy state responsibility, as the general rule of public 
international law is that private individuals, both natural and legal, are not directly 
bound by international law. Private individuals whose acts or omissions are 
incompatible with international human rights law bear no legal liability on that ground 
(but may of course very well be responsible under national legislation).  
 
The state will, as mentioned above, bear responsibility for acts by its organs or by 
representatives of the state when serving as such a representative (even though the state 
official exceeds his/her limits of power). But the state will also be responsible for its 
failures to act appropriately to meet its international obligations, even when private 
persons conduct the substantive breach. A state cannot look the other way, and stay 
passive when private persons violate the human rights of others. Rebecca Cook states 
that the ‘state will be responsible not directly for the private acts, but for its own lack of 
diligence to prevent, control, correct, or discipline such private acts though its own 
executive, legislative, or judicial organs’.45  Governments will be required to take 
preventive steps to protect the exercise and enjoyment of human rights –in this case the 
right to be free from coercion when entering into wedlock. This will include having 
internal laws prohibiting the use of forced marriages. The state does also have a duty to 
investigate violations that are alleged and to punish violations that are proven. The state 
                                                 
45 Cook, Rebecca J.,(1994), p.228-256 
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shall provide effective remedies, including compensation to the victims. In the case of 
forced marriages, the state may be obligated to provide shelters to help the victims as 
well, as this will form an important part of the protection against a possibly ‘vindictive’ 
family of the victim.  
 
In determining what states can be held accountable for when it comes to private 
violations, one has to examine the nature of the right in question. A state can never be 
asked to guarantee 100% that no human right will be violated by a private person, but 
the state has to show due diligence in awareness of the risk of human rights violations.  
 
These principles have been developed by international human rights tribunals to apply 
to international human rights conventions. In the Rodríguez decision did the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights imposed liability on Honduras for lack of due 
diligence in preventing unexplained ‘disapperances’, since the state thereby  had failed 
‘to ensure’ respect for human rights. The state had not kept its responsibility to respond 
appropriately to potential or actual private conduct. Nor had the state fulfilled its 
responsibility to ‘organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures 
through which public power is exercised, so that they are all capable of juridically 
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights’.46 
 
It is the individuals that are the beneficiaries of the international human rights protection 
against forced marriages, and they are just as vulnerable to violations of their human 
rights performed by private persons as they are to violations conducted by officers of 
the state. It is therefore crucial for the maintenance of the human rights protection, that 
the responsibility of the states is understood to be more than just to passively not engage 
in violation of the rights themselves, but that they also have to meet international 
obligations to deter and condemn such violations conducted by private persons. 
Rebecca Cook has formulated the content of state responsibility like this: 
 
                                                 
46  Velásquez Rodríguez Case of the Court of September 10, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
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State responsibility includes taking appropriate action to prevent objectionable private action, to monitor 
private acts that constitute violations, for instance through human rights monitors and police monitors, 
and to sanction and remedy acts of violation that are identified.’47 
 
The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women states clearly that: 
 
States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination.   
 
Article 4 (c) of the Declarations furthermore states that the States should ‘exercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts 
of violence against women, whether those are perpetrated by the State or by private 
actors’  
 
Some guidance on the specific action entailed by such obligations may be found in the 
Provisions of specific treaties or UN Resolutions, and findings and recommendations of 
international human rights courts and mechanisms provide more detailed knowledge on 
the specific content such obligations impose on the state. The CEDAW Committee 
listed in Gen. Rec no. 19 measures that the states should take in order to provide for the 
effective protection of women against gender-based violence. Such measures should 
inter alia include: 
"(i) Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and 
compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence, including, inter 
alia, violence and abuse in the family, sexual assault … 
(ii) Preventive measures, including public information and education programmes to 
change attitudes concerning the roles and status of women and men… 
(iii) Protective measures, including refuges, counselling, rehabilitation action and 
support services for women who are the victims of violence or who are at risk of 
violence." 
                                                 
47  Cook, Rebecca J.,(1994), p.228-256 
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The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and the Beijing 
Platform for Action provide further guidance on what actions governments are to take to 
address violence against women. (Siter herfra) 
 
INTERRIGHTS (referanse) deduces from the abovementioned material that it can be 
concluded that, in the context of forced marriage, states are obligated to:  
‘provide effective penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions;  
provide that the legal requirement of marriage includes the free and full consent of both 
parties;  
prescribe suitable minimum ages of marriage, prohibit child marriage, encourage the 
use of facilities whereby the consent of both parties may be freely expressed and 
marriages may be registered and generate social support for the enforcement of laws on 
the minimum age of marriage;  
provide women with access to justice, including information about their rights, free 
legal and other assistance, and safe shelter to ensure they are able to have recourse to 
such remedies;  
ensure that legal and judicial procedures be made victim-sensitive; exercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of forced marriage;  
ensure that women at risk of or subjected to forced marriage have specialised assistance, 
such as treatment, counselling, health and social services, facilities and support 
structures;  
develop appropriate guidelines for the training of law enforcement officials, the 
judiciary, legal practitioners and for any government authorities who are responsible for 
ensuring effective protection against forced marriage; develop national plans of action 
to promote the protection of women against any form of violence, in particular, forced 
marriage;  
facilitate the work of, and provide resources to, the women's movement and non-
governmental organisations in addressing forced marriage;  
ensure co-operation with NGOs by police and immigration officers, medical personnel 
and other law enforcement and judicial officials;  
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conclude appropriate national, subregional, regional and international agreements to 
prevent the abduction of, and the sale or traffic in, women or children for any purpose or 
in any form 
and provide technical co-operation to developing countries and share experiences, best 
practices and lessons learned in order to combat trafficking for any purpose, including 
forced marriage.  
Jeg tenkte jeg kunne bruke noe av dette flettet sammen med CEDAW artikkel 2 for så å 
beskrive de ulike tiltakene jeg har tenkt å gå inn på. Forbud i lov omhandlende ekteskap 
og straff finnes i både Pakistan og Norge, mens visum og asyl tenkte jeg bare å beskrive 
fra et norsk synspunkt.  
 
5 The Debate on Colliding Human Rights, Women’s Positions and 
Multiculturalism 
Forced marriages constitute a breach of women’s human rights and the states are after 
the doctrine of state responsibility (chapter 4) obliged to provide some sort of protection 
against it. As mentioned above, one must at the very least demand a prohibition of 
forced marriages in the law of the state. Arguments have furthermore been made that 
the states’ obligation reaches further than that. The states must also prosecute violations 
of the law.  Measures to prevent forced marriages from happening (a duty the states 
have after the CEDAW art. 2 and other human rights instruments) can take on different 
forms. There can be different opinions on what measures are efficient and correct to use 
in given situations The views on what measures to appropriately apply may to a certain 
extent vary after which theoretical approach one has to human rights. In the general 
human rights discourse there is an on-going discussion as to whether multiculturalism is 
bad for women. I will give a summary of this debate and the different viewpoints, as 
this provides a useful background to the practice of forced marriages. In discussions 
concerning harmful practices such as forced marriages, one hears on one side the 
‘excuse of culture’ (that this is a cultural, or religious, custom that it will be 
discriminatory to interfere with) and on the other side the categorical dismissal of 
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arranged marriages altogether. In my opinion, it is important to see the problem from 
different angles, avoiding the danger of becoming categorical and biased. 
 
5.1 Universalism  
Universalism claims that international human rights, like for instance gender-equality, 
freedom and self-determination (and hence the liberty to choose one’s spouse freely) are 
and shall be the same everywhere. The theory emphasizes the similarities between all 
human beings, groups and situations, and does not find the social and cultural context 
relevant when it comes to establishing rights for the individual. Universalism bases 
itself upon the idea that the norms and values embodied in the human rights doctrine are 
overriding and universal. If a conflict between norms is to occur, it is to be resolved by 
the establishment of a hierarchy of values and sources. The human rights are to be 
placed at the top of the ‘pyramid of values’.48 
 
Since the human rights system consists of a plurality of norms embracing both 
individual and communal rights, there can also be found conflicting values within the 
human rights system. The tense relationship between the CEDAW’s principle of 
equality within the family (art. 16) and the right to freedom of religion in for instance 
ICCP (art.18) can serve as an illustration of this. Universalism arranges the human 
rights in a hierarchy so that the individualistic values and principles always take 
precedence over communitarian values in order to solve such conflicts. Human rights 
theory determines self-determination and freedom and other, similar human rights 
principles in the light of uniformly held standards regardless of the existing cultural and 
legal differences. It has been stated that this should be the case for the non-
discrimination principle as well.49  
                                                 
48 Hellum (1999), p.409 and following 
49 Hellum(1999), p.414 
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5.1.1 The Critique of Universalism 
Universalism is closely linked to Western jurisprudence and its perception of human 
rights, and many scholars have thus raised the question: Is the idea of universal human 
rights yet another exercise of colonial power in the sense that objectives and concepts 
that originate in one culture are used to describe, assess and even change realities in 
another? Women advocating change in a culture on the basis of universally held human 
rights standards are often accused of being Westernized and alienated from their own 
culture.50  It has been pointed out that the universality of standards, with the main focus 
on individualistic rights such as freedom and equal opportunities, seems to presuppose a 
society that is atomized and individualistic. These are characteristic features of Western 
societies, but are rarely found in other parts of the world, which may indicate that while 
universalism may be applicable in Western culture it does not necessarily function 
equally well in other parts of the world.51 
 
Critics see universalism as being somewhat arrogant and paternalistic, diminishing the 
individual’s opportunity to make certain choices on her own (living in a polygonous 
marriage, for instance). The notion is that by taking universally held standards of human 
rights, or cross-cultural norms, as a standard for all the diverse cultures and societies of 
the world one fails to pay respect to people’s freedom to lead lives that differ from the 
standard. Telling individuals of such cultures and societies that their own choices are 
bad for them is patronizing and paternalistic. Instead, people should be viewed as their 
own best judges in determining what constitutes operative values for themselves. Such a 
position is implied in what Nussbaum refers to as the ‘argument from the good of 
diversity’ reminding us ‘that our world is rich in part because we do not all agree on a 
single set of practices and norms’ and that ‘the world risks becoming impoverished as it 
becomes more homogeneous’.52 
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As a response to that objection, one can point out that universalism maintains that 
freedom and equality for each individual is the essential thing, and in order for all 
individuals to be capable of choosing which life to lead, one is in need of some 
universal standards to protect those rights. A further claim has been made, namely that 
many existing value systems already are highly paternalistic, especially with regard to 
women in the sense that they are so frequently discriminated against. In fact, invoking 
any norm of non-discrimination can be regarded as paternalistic and interfering on the 
part of the ones who discriminate, but that should still not be seen as a valid argument 
for abstaining from promoting non-discrimination. In the words of Nussbaum:  
 
We dislike paternalism because there is something else that we like, namely liberty of 
choice in fundamental matters. It is fully consistent to reject some forms of paternalism 
while supporting others that underwrite these basic values.53 
5.2 Cultural Relativism 
In the theory of cultural relativism one finds responses to the aforementioned objections 
against universalism. Cultural relativism denies that conflicts between values from 
different traditions and cultures can be settled in any reasonable way.  Every society, 
law and culture is instead regarded as one-of-a-kind and incomparable to others, so that 
one has to understand each unit in its own right. This theory is in strict opposition to 
universalism as it looks at the uniqueness of all human beings, groups and situations, 
rather than the similarities between them. Human conduct is seen as the result of any 
given culture and society and cultural relativism therefore concludes that overriding and 
universal standards do not exist. One finds that normative categories and standards 
originating in one culture cannot be justified as appropriate for other cultures that 
traditionally have adopted different normative categories and standards. The theory 
aims at establishing greater equality and understanding of cultures and societies, and is 
critical of the Western world’s tendency to measure a culture or society against the 
‘ideal’ society, i.e. a society with a Western economic and legal system. As a 
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consequence, focus has been directed at group’s human rights, particularly the group’s 
right to self-determination and cultural integrity.54 
 
5.2.1 Critique of Cultural Relativism 
Although it is easy to agree with the notion that one shall respect different cultures, it is 
not unproblematic to focus on community rights exclusively. If such a line of reasoning 
is taken to the extreme, as done by some culture-relativists, one can find oneself coming 
up with, for instance, the notion that human rights are irrelevant in some non-Western 
societies, since members of such societies view themselves not as individuals, but as 
members of a group.55 Even if one is to accept such an extreme position, one will still 
require reference to at least some universal rights in order to ensure the groups’ right to 
choose freely how it wishes to function. Otherwise one is left with the possibility of 
anarchy, which again is in direct contradiction to the starting point of cultural 
relativism, namely that one shall protect the uniqueness of every society and culture. In 
my opinion, this goes to show that one is in need of at least some aspect of universalism 
in human rights discourse. 
 
Opponents of the theory have furthermore stated that the notion cultural relativists have 
of traditional cultures is far too simplistic, as cultures are not immutable and static, but 
subject to change and transformation through political and cultural debate. Focusing 
only on group rights means that one has to assume that the group has common goals in 
order to protect their traditions and customs, since no one has an interest worthy of 
protection in upholding a practice in a group that is undesired by others in the group. 
Critics of the theory have pointed out that it is very often only the dominant voices of 
the culture that are heard when one establishes the notion of what the culture in question 
‘consists’ of. It is contended that culture relativists fail to take into account that the 
advocacy for change and the introduction of universally held principles of 
individualistic freedom in a culture often comes from the ‘weaker’ voices within the 
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culture. Frequently, the culture relativist takes an incorrectly founded assumption of a 
common goal for the group as a starting point, and in doing so fails to register the 
objections raised by the weaker party of the group with regard to goals and practices of 
the group as a whole. In many cultures one finds that the male voice has been 
pronouncing the goals of the group, and with a relativist view on human rights, one can 
easily overlook the women’s points of view and thus also women’s rights, since their 
voices ‘drown’ in the process of formulating the common goals of the group. Martha 
Nussbaum states that: 
 
It would be implausible to suggest that the many groups working to improve the employment conditions 
of women in the informal sector, for example, are brainwashing women into striving for economic 
opportunities: clearly, they provide means to ends women already want, and a context of female solidarity 
within which to pursue those ends. Where they do alter existing preferences, they typically do so by 
giving women a richer sense of both their own possibilities and their equal worth, in a way that looks 
more like a self-realization (…) than like brainwashing. Indeed, what may possibly be ‘Western’ is the 
arrogant supposition that choice and economic agency are solely Western values!56 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that by accepting cultural practices unconditionally, 
one is also accepting undesirable practices. The practices of female circumcision and 
forced marriages are gross examples of the fact that cultural traditions indeed can be 
harmful. 
5.3  In Between: Pluralism 
The pluralist theory offers a compromise between relativism and universalism by taking 
into account the objections to the two theories listed above. Pluralism sees conflicts in 
their cultural context, but does also make room for dialogue and change. It recognizes 
that there are some overriding norms and primary values that need protection, and states 
that a conflict between these can be resolved by ranking the values in a way that is 
sensitive to the social and cultural context in which the individuals live and act. 
Pluralism is in my opinion thus more respectful of culture than universalism, and 
therefore less paternalistic. Still, it is not as accepting as the culture relativist theory as it 
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states that we are in need of some universal norms to separate right from wrong -or in 
this case acceptable cultural practices (e.g. arranged marriages) from unacceptable ones 
(e.g. forced marriages). The pluralist theory is in that sense more protective of weak 
individuals and group members than relativism. 
 
An example of how one can use this theory in practice is the measures used in the 
struggle to eradicate female circumcision. Female circumcision, or genital mutilation as 
it is also called, is a practice that is closely linked to culture in the way that it is 
supposed to represent cleansing from sin, which is necessary for the inclusion of the 
girls into society as full members in their own right.  In Kenya, one has successfully 
introduced an alternative rite known as ‘Circumcision through words’ that supports the 
ritual coming of age without the practice of female genital mutilation.57  
 
As my examples are meant to illustrate I find it important to take into consideration the 
impact culture will have on the implementation of human rights (in my thesis the right 
to freedom from force in matters of matrimony), but it is also essential to have some 
overriding norms to ensure certain basic rights. Cruelty cannot be accepted in the name 
of culture.  
 
 
5.4 Culture vs. Non-discrimination and the Debate on Multiculturalism 
There has been a growing acknowledgement in Western countries that minority cultures 
no longer shall have to assimilate into the majority culture, as this would be oppressive. 
Instead, Western countries seek to adapt policies that that are more sensitive to the 
inherent cultural differences between the minority groups and the majority of citizens. 
The whole discussion on so-called multiculturalism is closely linked to the debate on 
universalism. The viewpoints of multiculturalism are rooted in the cultural relativist 
argument of the good of diversity, claiming that each culture is valuable in itself, and 
thus shall be protected. 
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Cohen, Howards and Nussbaum define multiculturalism as the idea that 
 
‘people in other cultures, foreign and domestic, are human beings too –moral equals, entitled to equal 
respect and concern, not to be discounted or treated as a subordinate caste. Thus understood, 
multiculturalism condemns intolerance of other ways of life, finds the human in what might seem Other, 
and encourages cultural diversity.’58 
 
Multiculturalism  
 
‘represents the view that culture provides the necessary and inescapable context of human life, that all 
moral and political doctrines tend to reflect and universalise their cultural origins, that all cultures are 
partial and benefit from the insight of others, and that truly universal values can be arrived at only by 
means of an uncoerced and equal intercultural dialogue.’59  
 
Arguments for multiculturalism state that self-respect is of fundamental importance. To 
gain that, it is essential to belong to a culture. It is also important to have a cultural 
context in which to develop an ability to choose how to lead one’s life.   
 
Multiculturalists point out that such groups have their own ‘societal cultures’ that 
permeate all aspects of the lives of their members, and -as the societal cultures are 
threatened by extinction- that there should be special rights to protect them. The debate 
centres on what one shall do when the cultural and religious groups that claim 
protection adhere to policies and viewpoints that treat the women of their groups 
unequally.  
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5.4.1 Objections towards Multiculturalism from a Perspective of Women’s 
Human Rights 
It is evident that there is tension between egalitarianism and multiculturalism, as some 
cultures do not commit to the principle that all people are entitled to equal respect and 
concern. Especially when it comes to views on the position of women, we find 
diverging opinions concerning what roles they are to perform in the group.  
 
The problems of multiculturalism become particularly evident when one -in the keeping 
with the desire for cultural diversity- wishes to grant cultural and religious minorities 
certain group rights which will enable them to preserve their society and culture from 
undue pressure on their ways of life. For how is one to defend such a proposal if the 
societies and cultures in question treat their female members as subordinate and not of 
equal worth? 
 
In the debate over whether multiculturalism is bad for women, a central question has 
been raised: ‘How should we understand a commitment to equality in a world of 
multiple human differences, grim hierarchies of power, and cruel divisions of life 
circumstance?’60 
 
Feminism, defined by Okin as  
 
‘the belief that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having 
equal dignity to that of men, and that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely 
chosen lives as men can’61 
 
may come into conflict with the aspect of multiculturalism that concerns  -again in the 
words of Okin- 
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‘the claim, made in the context of basically liberal democracies, that minority cultures or ways of life are 
not sufficiently protected by the practice of ensuring the individual rights of their members, and as a 
consequence these should also be protected through special group rights or privileges’.62 
 
Others have supported her view by pointing out that nearly every culture and society in 
the world treats women unequally in one aspect or another. Pollit has put it like this:  
 
In its demand for equality for women, feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually every culture on 
earth. You could say that multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural traditions, while feminism 
interrogates and challenges all cultural traditions.63 
 
It has been argued that group rights can be antifeminist if the practices and ideologies 
concerning gender in the group facilitate discrimination of women. Such group rights 
would then limit the opportunities for women in the group to live lives that truly have 
been chosen freely on an equal basis with men.  
 
The adverse effects of group rights are frequently greater for women. There is a 
connection between culture and gender, as women are often regarded as the bearers of 
culture. Honour is a strong value, giving rise to the notion that women’s sexuality, as 
well as their general behaviour, need to be controlled. However, also personal law and 
other laws regulating the private sphere affect women to a greater degree. Besides, the 
one whose main role is to remain in the home will find it difficult to participate in and 
influence the public arenas of culture and politics, and it is those arenas that rules for the 
private sphere are decided upon. The women are regarded as bearer of the culture and 
the protectors of honour.  
 
Okin points out, like Nussbaum among others, that too little attention is paid to the fact 
that there may be differences within the group. Furthermore, she objects to the way 
advocates for group rights disregard the private sphere. The group is often seen as a 
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unified agent. In order to realise the rights needed to preserve tradition and its interest, 
those traditions and interests need to be identified. Internal disagreement will obscure 
the identification, and will thus become a threat to the ability of the group to protect its 
rights. ‘Group leaders are therefore motivated to foster unanimity, or at least an 
appearance of unanimity, even at the cost of internal oppression.’64  
 
5.4.2 Can Multiculturalism and Feminism Co-Exist? 
Feminism and multiculturalism have, in Kymlicka’s view, a common goal in the sense 
that they both point out that traditional liberal conceptions are inadequate, since 
insisting on equal individual formal rights is not enough to ensure equality. One needs 
both equality in terms of opportunity, there must also be de facto equality. The 
traditional assumption that equality requires identical treatment is challenged by both of 
the theories.65 
 
Multiculturalism may function harmonically in co-existence with feminism as long as it 
supports group members’ choice not only to choose tradition, but also to abandon it. If 
multiculturalism aims solely at defending endangered cultures it will most likely end up 
focusing on the group’s interests rather than those of the individual. 
 
Will Kymlicka agrees with the liberal notion that it is as important with justice within 
ethnocultural groups as it is with justice between different groups. It is also important to 
have a cultural context in which to develop an ability to choose how to lead one’s life. 
This requires liberalism internally.(referral to Kymlica here) He divides the group rights 
into two categories, namely the ‘internal restrictions’ and the ‘external protections’. 
Internal restrictions are characterised by the groups’ wish to impose restrictions on the 
individual’s freedom of choice, whereas external protections are meant to promote 
justice between groups. Such protective measures may be a guaranteed right to political 
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representations, compensation for historical injustices and of language rights, as long as 
they aim at ‘ensuring that members of the minority group have the same effective 
capacity to promote their interests as the majority’. He does not believe in granting the 
group the right to impose restrictions on the free choices of its members, but advocates 
that the latter form of group right shall be awarded minority cultures.66  
 
Raz points out that we cannot only accept group rights to cultures that are 100% just to 
women, as we then would demand more of these cultures than of our own. Western 
countries are still unjust to women in many aspects. He therefore agrees with Kymlica 
that one should accept ‘general measures in a multiculturalist spirit’ and reject 
‘measures that perpetrate oppression or violation of basic civil rights’. He welcomes 
measures aimed at  
 
‘enhancing an understanding and acceptance of cultural diversity in the population at large, replacing the 
attitude of a majority that agrees to tolerate minorities with one of coexistence of various groups within 
the general framework of one civic and political culture’ 
 
and stresses that  
 
‘[t]he point of the distinction is that the need to put an end to specific cultural practices, such as parents’ 
marrying off young teenage girls, should not be regarded as a reason to deny respect and general support 
to the group whose practices they are. We do not reject our own culture when we find that it replete with 
oppression and the violation of rights; we try to reform it.’67 
 
In order to achieve this, the state’s strategy has to maintain a double focus. The state 
should promote recognition and respect for all the cultures it contains, as well as protect 
individuals against unjust or discriminatory treatment, whether on the basis of gender or 
any other reason. Raw realises that such a focus will give raise to difficult problems 
where different, seemingly sound values will come into conflict, and where a solution 
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will demand the sacrifice of some of these values. But, as he points out, the ‘need for 
sensible multicultural measures arises out of dilemmas generated by imperfect reality. 
They represent the least worst policy, not a triumphal new discovery’.68 In his view, it is 
not the task of multiculturalism to try to preserve the purity of different cultures. One 
should instead  
 
‘enable them to adjust and change to a new form of existence within a larger 
community, while preserving their integrity, pride in their identity, and continuity with 
their past and with others of the same culture in different countries.’69 
 
The notion of survival is strong in these debates, Tamir points out. In the discussion of 
group rights any reform of tradition/culture is seen as an endangerment to the group, 
and must therefore be counteracted. This is a misrepresentation of reality and 
intentionally obscures the distinction between two kinds of destruction of a culture:  
 
‘the first results from external pressures “exhorted” by nonmembers; the second, from the desire of 
members of the community. It is not just and fair to protect a culture against the wishes of its own 
members.70 
 Besides, as Tamir puts it: 
 
‘A great deal of paternalism is embedded in the assumption that while “we” can survive change and 
innovation and endure the tensions created by modernity, “they” cannot; that “we” can repeatedly 
reinvent ourselves, our culture, our tradition, while “they” must adhere to known cultural patterns. These 
assumptions are particularly damaging for women who can improve their social status only by 
challenging traditional norms. If a society cannot undergo change while retaining its identity, then the 
aspiration of women to improve their social position necessarily comes into conflict with the rights of the 
group. 
                                                 
68 Raz in Okin (1999) p.97 
69 Raz  in Okin (1999) p.99 
70 Tamir, in Okin (1999) p. 49 
  41 
 If, however, culture and tradition are seen in a less static light, then reformers could be seen as 
contributing to the preservation of the communal identity no less than conservatives. The fate of a culture, 
a language, or a religion ought to be determined by its members. For that purpose one must grant cultural, 
religious, national rights to individuals rather than to the community as a whole.’71 
 
Sassen points out that it is important to bear in mind that minority cultures are not 
necessarily discriminatory against women. She has in her work come across examples 
where the minority culture is regarded as providing a safe haven and a feeling of 
solidarity vis-à-vis a discriminating host culture. She does not deny that many cultures 
have large intracultural gender inequalities, but stresses that one has to recognise the 
many sources of pain and rage that derive from the intercultural dynamics of 
domination/discrimination. And when doing so, one may well find that this is ‘strategic 
for eliminating or reducing the conditions that led to the demand for group rights in the 
first place’. 72 
 
5.5 Obligation to Modify Harmful and Traditional Customs and Practices 
 
It has sometimes been argued that a cautious approach is required in relation to state 
intervention in cases of forced marriage, as the practice is embedded in cultural 
traditions or religious beliefs, in particular those of ethnic or religious minorities, and 
may not therefore be treated as a violation of human rights. However, under 
international law, there is a duty to modify or abolish existing customs or practices 
which constitute discrimination against women, and insofar as forced marriages clearly 
discriminate against women, there is an obligation to end the practice. 
 
5.5.1 Protection of religious freedom 
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Nussbaum objects to Okin’s simplified view on religion. She states that Okin regards 
religion as oppressing to women, without offering anything else. If then to be held up 
against the Enlightenment’s goal of full equal dignity to all, religion will have to yield 
every time. Such a view on religion does, however, fail to take into account the good 
things that derive from religion, such as ‘its role in people’s search for the ultimate 
meaning of life; in consoling people for the deaths of loved ones and in helping them 
face their own mortality; in transmitting moral values; in giving people a sense of 
community and civic dignity; in giving them imaginative and emotional fulfilment –
and, not least, its role in many struggles for moral and political justice.’73 Okin will also 
alienate possible allies in the fight for equality by being paternalistic through her 
indication that religion has no good to offer. It is important to have respect for religious 
people. Okin: ‘Of course it is good that pro-religion feminists are seeking out and trying 
to foster the most woman-friendly strands within their own religions. But to do so does 
not entail denying or even downplaying the dominant patriarchal strands that have so 
long prevailed within them.’74  
 
 
 
5.5.2 Protection Against Discrimination on the Basis of Culture  
Defences of culture used in criminal cases draw attention to the negative aspects of the 
culture, and is in that way counter-productive. If being heard with such a defence, the 
state will through its judicial system have failed to protect women against male 
violence, and a women’s right to equal protection of the law is violated. Why should 
women belonging to a minority culture in a Western state be less protected against 
discrimination and male violence than a woman of the majority culture?  
 
Pollitt raises objections to the use of culture as a defence from another angel. Is the 
excuse based on fact? Besides, claims of cultural defence cannot be made by 
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representatives from just any culture. This, she claims, is in part because 
multiculturalism is connected to Third Worldism and ‘the appeals that Third Worldism 
makes to white liberal guilt’, and in part because the host countries see that cultures 
similar to their own are ‘dynamic societies in which change is constant and interests 
clash’. The excuse works best if the host country knows little about the culture the 
immigrant perpetrator belongs to. Then it is easier to depict the culture as stable and 
constant, and the perpetrator of the crime can more easily come across as a naïve 
product of his old-fashioned culture that could not be expected to have the capacity to 
understand and adapt to the laws of the mainstream society. Pollitt points out that such 
notion are not based in reality, as one can hardly find a culture that never changes in the 
world to day.75  
 
5.6 Through Cultures: Internal Discourse and Cross-Cultural Dialogue 
The Muslim scholar An-Na’im has suggested a way of ending unwanted practices by 
using a pluralist approach in reference to the conflicts between the CEDAW and Islamic 
law, or between cultural practices and the CEDAW. Shari’a family law is fundamentally 
based on the notion of male guardianship over women, and contains many features of 
inequality between men and women. It is, for example, much easier for a man to get a 
divorce than for a woman, and this is in direct contradiction with CEDAW article 16(c) 
which states that the State Parties shall ensure: ‘The same rights and responsibilities 
during marriage and at its dissolution.’  
 
An-Na’im states that there is a need for cross-cultural (or universal, if you like) norms, 
and takes as a starting point that it is the Shari’a that needs to be changed in order to be 
in accordance with the international human rights’ system, and not the other way 
around. He shows that one can interpret the Qur’an in ways that does not come in 
conflict with the CEDAW. Then he emphasizes that individuals from the Muslim 
society must make the implementation of this interpretation he calls an internal 
discourse. An-Na’im stresses that it is very important that the advocators for change are 
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Muslim, since the Islamic world often feels that the West tries to impose its views and 
moral perceptions upon Muslims. If Muslims themselves work from within the culture, 
there is not the same risk that resentment, protests and feelings of alienation will arise 
from the Islamic world. 76 
 
The challenge with such an approach is in my opinion to find the right speed do conduct 
the internal discourse. Going too slowly will send out signals that women’s rights are 
not a priority and of little importance, and going too fast may increase the risk of 
pushing Muslims over to the fundamentalists, as they find the new developments to be 
out of tune with, and too revolutionary and progressive for their own religious 
perception of Islam.  
 
Although forced marriages are a cultural practice, and not a religious one, the same 
procedure can be applicable. This is especially so, since the conductors of forced 
marriages often will perceive the practice as acceptable, and perhaps even encouraged, 
by Islam. The key word for the procedure of changing religion or culture from within is 
respect. In that way one will avoid being paternalistic. 
 
In my opinion this example shows that it is important to remember to be careful and 
sensitive to the people whose practices one wishes to change. The risk is there, that 
attempts at change may be looked upon as arrogant an insulting of a culture. The risk is 
especially high when it comes to implementing article 16 of the CEDAW, since equality 
in the family is not a universal norm in itself. Very many cultures, both Islamic and 
others, including some Western countries base their conception of the family on the idea 
of complementarity and equal worth instead of equality. Some pluralists, like Sardar 
Ali, have suggested that one might not put so much emphasis on the equality-term, but 
instead concentrate on ensuring everyone equal access to different rights.  
 
                                                 
76 An-Na’im, Abdullahi in Cook, Rebecca J. (1994) p.167-188 
  45 
It is my opinion that such a procedure can be a useful approach to promote change in 
minority cultures in general. It has worked for the CRC, which is ratified by almost all 
the states in the world, and has a widespread support. In this connection it is interesting 
to note that the CRC-committee has been much better at implementing a gender-
perspective in their examination of reports than the other human rights committees.77 
 
A variation over the same approach is presented by Ms. Ali who states that that one 
with reference to Muslim groups can play the ‘Islamic Card’ in order to promote 
change. Such a procedure is a kind of internal discourse where one is to look at the 
practice (like forced marriages) and holds it up to Islam in order to see if they are 
consistent. Put informal), the actor promoting the change thus says: ‘Well, if you say 
you are Muslim, you have to obide Islam. This practice is unislamic, so you must stop 
adhering to it.’78  She stresses the importance of working from within Islam: ‘The 
secularisation of the women’s rights movement would alienate and exclude many 
women. Furthermore, the abandonment of a struggle within Islam would leave the path 
clear for extremists and restrictive arguments, thus endangering the status of women 
even more’79 as ‘the struggle for equality in Muslim societies must come from within 
those societies if it is to be successful’80.  
 
If these procedures are to be implemented in the Norwegian work against forced 
marriages, one has to combine legal measures stating a universal, cross-cultural 
message that forced marriages are unacceptable with work conducted by members of 
the minority culture (internal discourse). I will return to this approach and the 
possibilities to use it on cases of forced marriages among minority cultures in Norway 
after I have gone through the Norwegian legislation, the possibilities if the forced 
marriage is conducted in Pakistan and the rules regarding consent in marriage in Islam. 
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5.6.1 Islam and the Charge from Cultures 
Azizah Y. Al-Hibri points out that it is important to distinguish between religion and 
culture81 . This can be seen as one way of conducting of internal discourse and 
promoting change from within. The Islamic society is based on a system based on the 
individual right to itjihad (jurisprudential interpretation of a religious text). This means 
that there are no central authority has the task of interpreting the religion to its believers. 
Instead, both men and women engage in itjihad to interpret the religion of their own. 
Islam guarantees every Muslim, both man and woman, freedom of conscience and since 
Islam was revealed as a world religion, it celebrates diversity, according to the Qur’an, 
49:13. This goes to follow, she argues, that a Muslim country may retain all local 
customs not inconsistent with Islamic revelation. As a result, many countries have 
retained local custom found controversial by the outsiders, and by error, these have been 
perceived to be Islam-both by the West and sometimes within the culture. Islamic 
jurisprudence adopts the principle that many laws change with the change of time and 
place, yet many Muslims continue to follow the jurisprudence of past centuries and 
civilisations . 
 
’A true feminist call to reform in Muslim countries or among Muslim immigrants must 
respect their religious and cultural sentiments, while recognizing the sanctity of the first 
and the flexibility of the second.’  p.43.  She states that the best approach for advocating 
change must be for Muslim feminists to re-examine Islamic jurisprudence critically in 
light of jurisprudential principles (and the mashala of the Muslims). She comes up with 
a tripartite strategy: 
1) Clearly separate customary from religious practices (which will reduce Muslim 
resistance to change of the cultural kind. 
2) Re-examine existing jurisprudence critically to reveal any inappropriate cultural 
elements in it. 
                                                 
81 Okin (1999) p.43 
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3) Provide modern contributions to Islamic jurisprudence, which take into account the 
time, place and mashala of women, half of whom are women.  
 
 
6 Measures to Be Taken 
As my review of the legal literature hopefully has shown it is not easy to establish one 
clear definition of the term forced marriage. The boundaries are not sharply delineated. 
According to international conventions, marriages should be of free consent. Forced 
marriages are thus a violation of human rights. As previously stated, the CEDAW has 
opened up for a pluralist approach to implementation in article 2, where the states are 
under obligation to implement the non-discrimination principle, but are allowed to use 
appropriate measures in doing so. This opens for the possibility of considering social, 
cultural and economic factors during implementation. See also point on measures in 
Norway. 
 
In order to help possible victims of forced marriages, one needs both preventive 
measures to stop forced marriages from happening, as well as restorative measures to 
help those who have already been forced to enter marriage against their will. The two 
categories of measures will be quite different in form and content, as they will seek to 
help out young people at risk in two very different situations. There will also be a great 
span between the individual measures and the more all-over general preventive 
measures such as information campaigns and competence building.  
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As legal sociology has shown us, it is not always enough to pass a law in order to 
eradicate an unwanted phenomenon. Sociological jurisprudence has proved that it is not 
necessarily sufficient to pass a new law in order to change people’s behaviour, and that 
the laws work best if people support the ‘moral valuation’ justifying the laws86. It is not 
very likely that people whose view on parenting already diverges from the one of the 
legislative authorities will refrain from entering agreements like this, simply because 
they are prohibited by law.  If there is a will, there will in most cases also be a way to 
find a loophole in the law. This is especially true when it comes to a phenomenon such 
as forced marriages as it will be almost impossible to stop all incidents just by passing a 
law. Marriages are in themselves more of a private rather than a public nature. The 
reasons why one enters marriage may vary and are not always visible. Thus the 
pressure/coercion from third parties in the case of forced marriage is often difficult to 
prove. This is obviously not the same as arguing that a ban on forced marriages is 
unnecessary. On the contrary, this must be the natural starting point in any campaign 
against forced marriages. And as I have shown above, there are numerous international 
treaties that establish that this is indeed the legal situation of today world wide. Thus we 
find the same rules in both Norwegian and Pakistani national legislation, as well. 
However, if one wishes to prevent all forced marriages from happening, one needs more 
than just a law. It is crucial to change the public opinion and values of those who 
practice such marriages, as that would lessen the incitement to search for ways of 
avoiding the law.  
 
 
6.1 Legislation in Norway -a Brief Overview 
The general starting point that marriages are to be entered into with consent of both 
parties is (as previously mentioned) set forth in international conventions that Norway 
have ratified (see section 2 of this thesis). According to these instruments and the rules 
                                                 
86See for instance Mathiesen (2001), p.59 and following 
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concerning state responsibility is Norway obliged to ensure that the right to marriage 
and right to freedom from forced marriages are protected.  
 
Protection against forced marriages is also found in Norwegian state law. The European 
Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are made a 
part of Norwegian law directly with the Human Rights Act of 1999.87 The treaties have 
a somewhat special status in Norwegian law. They are, subsequent to section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act, elevated to a level between the ordinary legislation and the 
Constitutional level as they are to take precedence over any other legislative provisions 
that conflict with them.  
 
There are furthermore provisions in the Penal Code that makes it punishable to compel 
someone into an unwanted marriage, and there are provisions in the Marriage Act that 
render it possible to get a forced marriage declared null and void. 
   
6.2 Criminal Law  
6.2.1 The general clause against illegal use of force 
As of today, Norway has no specific criminal provision concerning forced marriages, 
but such marriages are punishable under the general clause against illegal use of force 
which is to be found in the Norwegian Civil Penal Code section 222: 
 
‘Any person who by unlawful conduct or by any threat thereof compels another person to do, submit to, 
or omit to do anything, or who is accessory thereto, shall be liable to fines or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years. If there are specially aggravating circumstances, cf. section 232, third sentence, 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years may be imposed. 
                                                 
87 For the normative content of the rights concerning marriage embedded in these treaties, please see 
section 2 on international law above 
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Any person who by threatening to make an accusation or report of a criminal act or to make a defamatory 
allegation unlawfully compels another person to do, submit to, or omit to do anything, or who is 
accessory thereto, shall be liable to fines or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. 
If the felony has been committed against any of the offender's next of kin, a public prosecution will only 
be instituted when requested by the aggrieved person unless it is required in the public interest.’88 
 
While the Penal Code has several provisions prohibiting use of force in order to attain a 
specific purpose, the general clause does not contain a specific purpose as a prerequisite 
for criminal responsibility. The right protected by law is the freedom of action and 
personal liberty in general. 
 
The ordinary sentencing framework is fines or prison up to 3 years. If there are 
particularly aggravating circumstances, the maximum sentence is elevated up to 6 years. 
 
6.2.1.1 ‘Unlawful conduct’ 
According to section 222, first subparagraph, ‘unlawful conduct’ or threat thereof that 
compels another ‘to do, submit to, or omit to do anything’ is subject to punishment. 
Accomplices are also criminally responsible. Unlawful conduct and threats of such 
conduct are equalized. In practice threats will be the most common.89 The word 
‘unlawful’ refers to other norms in the legal system. A punishable offence would 
naturally be regarded as ‘unlawful conduct’, but a breach of other legal norms will also 
be covered. An act or threat of act that results in a duty to pay damages without criminal 
liability may be comprised by the provision. However, in these cases not all kinds of 
coercion will be considered constituting ‘unlawful conduct’. Whether the act is 
punishable or not will depend on what the victim is forced to do. It has been discussed 
whether certain acts that are not legally sanctioned can pass under section 222. Threats 
of suicide are presumed to fall under the scope of section 222, whereas one has 
                                                 
88 Unofficial translation to English by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice , can be found on the internet: 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.doc 
89 Bratholm/Matningsdal (1995) p. 512 
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discussed if threats of divorce shall be included.90 The ‘unlawful conduct’ can be 
directed at the forced one herself, or at relatives or close ones who have such a relation 
with the forced person that the threat will have an effect. 
 
If one compels someone to enter into a marriage under threats of violence, custodial 
confinement, deprivation of possessions or property or other illegalities, it will be 
punishable subject to section 222, first paragraph. It is more problematic if one threatens 
with strictly social sanctions. Parents or siblings can for instance threaten to end all 
contact with the victim, or parents can threaten the victim with eviction from the family 
home. These acts are in principle completely legal. But such threats can be just as 
radical for the threatened as for instance acts of violence, and are therefore suitable to 
deprive the victim of the personal liberty section 222 is meant to protect.  
 
As the phrase ‘unlawful conduct’ normally is understood to constitute a breach of a 
legal norm, civil or criminal,91 threats of strictly social consequences would therefore 
not be included according to the wording of the law. The legislative purpose, on the 
other hand, would be better fulfilled if threats of other sanctions than the ones that 
constitute breach of legal norms also are included, at least in the cases were the 
sanctions it is threatened with are very grave, and where the result of the use of force is 
such a gross violation of personal liberty as a forced marriage would be. Meanwhile, in 
Norwegian jurisprudence, it has always been the tradition to be restrictive when it 
comes to interpreting the wording of a penal provision extensively. That principle is also 
embedded in the Norwegian Constitution, section 96, which states that ‘no one may be 
convicted except according to law’.92 A Penal Code that is so wide and vague that the 
forseeability disappears, will defeat the purpose of this principle. If grave threats of 
                                                 
90 Bratholm/Matningsdal (1995) p. 513-514 with further references 
91 Andenæs, Johs (1997) p.143. Andenæs refers to the recommendations of the Commission on the Penal 
Code (Straffelovskommisjonen), which states that punishment shall only be used in the cases where the 
act according to the remaining existing civil legislation is illegal. (S.K.M 1896 p.98). 
92 Translation from Norwegian by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found 04.06.03 on the internet: 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
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sanctions that do not constitute a breach of legal norms are not to be included in the 
prohibition of use of force, we will face a system that fails to give protection against 
forced marriages in cases where sanctions involved in the threat are of the ‘right’ kind.  
 
There is no case law providing guidance when establishing the boundaries of what 
‘unlawful conduct’ is in relation to section 222, and the conclusion is uncertain. The 
only case we have is on this matter93 regarded a father who beat up his daughter, pulled 
her hair, kicked her and choked her until she threw up. These acts are clearly unlawful 
as they are punishable offences. The violence occurred a couples of weeks before the 
wedding and the court found proof for the fact that the violence was used in order to 
force her into the marriage (subjective guilt, see point 6.2.1.5 below) and that it was the 
compulsion that made the daughter enter into the marriage.  
 
6.2.1.2 ‘To compel’ 
To compel is to prevent someone from acting according to her own free will. It must in 
this context be enough that the threats affected the victim to do, submit to, or omit to do 
something the said person otherwise would not have done or accepted. The boundary 
towards arranged marriages may here raise a problem, since a line has to be drawn 
towards the different kinds of pressure parents legally can practice. Parents can make 
use of a variety of measures in order to make their children do things they do not want 
to, like homework or housework. It is not unlawful for parents to try to influence their 
children in their election of spouses, either. The British Working Group on Forced 
Marriages uses the term ‘loving manipulation’ as something the parents freely can 
exercise.94  A young woman who is urged every day by her parents to marry a man they 
have chosen, may very well experience such a pressure as insurmountable, but the 
parents are not committing a crime by doing so. Repeatedly informing the woman that 
she has to think about the honour of the family is not a crime either. It is the unlawful 
conduct that is punishable.  
                                                 
93 Case no. 02-00292 M/01 from Indre Follo Municipal Court (tingrett) 04th of April 2002 
94 Working Group 
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The distinction can be hard to draw from case to case. Where the marriage is entered 
into after illegal acts or threats of such acts aimed directly at the victim, is this clearly a 
forced marriage. The problems arise in cases where fear of certain consequences 
influences the woman to enter into a marriage that the parents wish for. This will be the 
case where, for instance, an older sibling has been subject to force, or where the parents’ 
attitudes or statements of a more general kind may be interpreted as implying that 
disobedience will lead to certain consequences (of the kind that constitutes ‘criminal 
conduct’ –see discussion above). In the cases where the parents (or others) have meant 
to influence the woman so that she enters into a marriage against her own will, or where 
they have  regarded the possibility for such an influence as likely, and the victim too has 
seen it this way, this is to be regarded as a forced marriage. In a famous Norwegian case 
where the parents abducted a young woman from Norway to Morocco and kept her in 
confinement there for a long period of time, the court stated that a threat can vary in 
form and strength. 95 
 
6.2.1.3 ‘To do, submit to, or omit to’ 
The result of the use of force is that the forced one must do, submit to, or omit to do 
something she otherwise would not have done. The wording is meant cover all 
hypothetical cases. The entering into a marriage is an active act that is covered by the 
alternative ‘to do’.  The alternative to ‘submit to’ covers cases where the forced one 
must remain passive, whereas cases when one is compelled not to marry a certain 
person are covered by the alternative ‘omit to’. 
 
6.2.1.4 Subjective guilt 
Before criminal liability can exist, there must be not only an objective breach of the 
penal provision, but also subjective guilt on part of the actor. The guilt must exist at the 
                                                 
95 Case no. 98-3021 M/77 from Oslo City Court (Oslo byrett) 10th of November 1998, p. 9. (The court did 
not, however, see that forced marriage was a central point in this particular case.) 
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moment when the act which creates liability is committed. Where a continuing activity 
is concerned one can be held criminally liable if one were to continue after becoming 
aware of the situation. 
 
The general rule on the degree of guilt required for criminal liability is set out in the 
Penal Code, § 40, first paragraph: ‘The penal provisions of this Code are not applicable 
to any person who has acted unintentionally unless it is explicitly provided or 
unambiguously implied that a negligent act is also punishable.’96 The offence must thus 
be intentional in order to be punishable after section 222. 
 
In order for an offence to be intentional, the act itself must be intentional (consciously 
willed). Liability for an intentional offence requires that the intent encompass not only 
the act itself, but also the consequences and the circumstances that make it an offence.97  
The conductors of forced marriages will fall under this scope, as long as the use of 
force/coercion is illegal, which it must be in order for it to be punishable. 
 
6.2.1.5 Attempted compulsion 
The crime is executed when the victim has yielded to the compulsion. If the perpetrator 
fails to compel the victim, the person in question can be punished for attempted 
compulsion after section 4998 in the Penal Code. 
                                                 
96 Translation from Norwegian by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found 03.06.03 at the internet: 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
97 Johannes Andenaes (1965), p. 192 
98 Section 49 states that ‘When a felony is not completed, but an act has been done whereby the 
commission of the felony is intended to begin, this constitutes a punishable attempt.’ Translated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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6.2.1.6 Aiding and abetting99  
Aiding and abetting to compulsion can also be punishable pursuant to first paragraph of 
section 222 (which opens for the punishment of anyone who is an accessory100 to the 
use of force).  Aiding and abetting can take place beforehand or during the crime, and 
be of a physical or a psychological nature.  
 
 In order to establish whether someone can be convicted of being an accessory to the use 
of force, one has to look at the actions of the person in question to see if those can be 
characterised as aiding and abetting to the act that the relevant provision (here: use of 
force) describes. It will constitute physical aiding and abetting just to participate in one 
way or the other in the preparation or the carrying-out of the crime. A mother who finds 
a suitable husband, or prepares for the wedding, leaving the use of force or the threats 
thereof up to the father, is punishable for accessory to the use of force. There does not 
have to be a casual link between the aiding and abetting and the crime. If for instance a 
father would have forced his daughter into a marriage regardless of the wife’s marriage 
preparations, she can still be punished as an accessory if she has contributed to such 
preparation. When it comes to psychological aiding and abetting, however, is it 
necessary that the support have an effect. Otherwise, it would only constitute attempted 
aiding and abetting. 101 A man supporting his brother’s intention to forcefully marry off 
his daughter can be punished for aiding and abetting if the brother would have refrained 
from forcing his daughter without the support. If it turns out that the brother would have 
forced his daughter into marriage regardless of what the man had said, the man can be 
punished for attempted aiding and abetting.   
 
                                                 
99  I use Craig’s translation of the noun ‘medvirkning’ with the term ‘aiding and abetting’. See Craig:‘Stor 
norsk-engelsk juridisk ordbok’(1999) p. 151  
100 I use the term ‘accessory’ here since it is used in the translation of the Penal Code by the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs. The Norwegian term ‘medvirkning’ has a slightly different meaning, as it does not 
include accessory after the fact, as the tradition has been in Anglo-American law. (For more on the 
translation of ‘medvirkning’, see: Craig, (1999) p. 151 
101 Slettan/ Øie (1997) p. 122 and following. 
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A particular question that may be quite relevant in cases of forced marriage, is whether 
one can be punished for being an accessory if one knows that the crime is about to be 
committed, and one remains passive. A brother knows, for instance, that his sister is to 
be married off against her own will, and he does nothing to stop it. According to 
Norwegian legal tradition, one has to distinguishs between knowledge of a crime and 
aiding and abetting.102  There is no general duty to prevent crime in Norway. In order 
for it to be punishable the passivity must be interpreted as encouraging for the 
perpetrator. This may easily move beyond a merely theoretical possibility in forced 
marriage cases in families with patriarchal family structures.  If the mother is to 
forcefully marry her daughter away, and the father knows of her conduct and does 
nothing to stop it, this could be interpreted as an incitement from the man considered to 
be the head of the family.  
 
One can be punished for aiding and abetting even if the main perpetrator cannot be 
punished and vice versa. The conditions governing criminal liability must be fulfilled 
for each perpetrator. Subjective guilt, legal age and sanity conditions have to be present 
in order for someone to be punished, ant these conditions may be fulfilled for the 
accessory and not the main perpetrator (or the other way around). A woman eagerly 
supporting her husband in the marrying of their daughter against her will, can be 
punished even though the father cannot, for instance because he was insane at the time 
of the crime.103  (If the accessory is forced into helping the main perpetrator, naturally 
she or he cannot be punished for aiding and abetting.104) 
 
 
                                                 
102Slettan/Øie(1997)p.126 
103 See chapter 3 in the Penal Code for the conditions governing criminal liability. 
104 For more information, see: Slettan/ Øie (1997) p. 127 
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6.2.2 Rules of prosecution 
If the felony is committed by the victim’s next-of-kin105, according to section 222, 3rd 
paragraph a public prosecution will only be instituted when requested by the aggrieved 
person unless it is required by public interest. In cases of forced marriages, it will often 
be the victim’s next-of-kin that is the perpetrator. There is reason to believe that 
prosecution will be instituted regardless of the victim’s request in most cases, since it 
would be of strong public interest that the grave kind of infringement on personal 
liberty which a forced marriage represents be prosecuted.106 The rules of prosecution 
regarding section 228 of the Penal Code concerning violence or other bodily assaults 
was altered in 1988 so that prosecution always would be public when the felony was 
perpetrated by the victim’s next-of-kin. This alteration reflects a stricter attitude towards 
violence within the family.107 It is reasonable to believe that the same attitude would 
apply towards forced marriages. The Ministry of Justice and the Police seems to be of 
the same opinion as it presumes in the green paper suggesting changes to the Penal 
Code that it in to day’s situation normally will be in the public interest to prosecute a 
mother or father compelling their child to get married.108 The decision of which cases to 
prosecute is to be taken by the Public Prosecution Office. 
 
 
                                                 
105 The term next-of-kin is defined in section 5 of the Penal Code:  ‘Wherever this code uses the term a 
person's next-of-kin, it thereby includes his spouse, ascendants and descendants, siblings and equally 
close relatives by marriage, foster-parents and foster-children, and his fiancée. If the marriage is 
dissolved, the said provisions shall continue to apply to events occurring before the dissolution. The 
spouse of a relative by marriage is also regarded as a relative by marriage.’ Translation from Norwegian 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found 03.06.03 at the internet:  
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
106 Hennum/ Paul opens for the possibility that there in some cases will not be in the public interest to 
prosecute, see Hennum/Paul (2000), p.44 
107 Andenæs/Bratholm, Anders(1996), p.52 
108 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003) p.15 
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6.2.3 Deprivation of liberty 
Victims can, in connection with forced marriages, find themselves deprived of their 
liberty. They can for instance be kept in unlawful custody by their family. Deprivation 
of liberty is prohibited in section 223109 of the Penal Code. 
 
Section 223 prohibits the unlawful deprivation of someone’s liberty. The right protected 
by the law is the individual’s right to freedom of movement and right to socialisation 
with others. The freedom of movement must be limited by physical obstruction. If no 
physical obstacles are present, the case may still be punishable subject to section 222.   
 
The removal of objects necessary for the person to move around freely is also 
considered as a physical obstruction. Deprivation of liberty can exist even if the 
freedom of movement is quite big within a larger area. Confiscation of passport, money 
or other possessions must therefore fall under the limits of the provision, if such 
confiscation holds the effect that the victim is kept within an area against her free will. 
In the Nadia-case, the court found that although the girl, Nadia, was not constantly 
locked up or under strict supervision, there was still unlawful deprivation of liberty as 
she was without passport and money and had no way to escape on her own. Constant 
surveillance was thus not a necessary condition, since she in fact was deprived of her 
liberty. In addition to this, the parents knew her whereabouts at all times. The parents 
were convicted for unlawful deprivation of liberty.110 
 
                                                 
109 Section 223 states that: ‘Any person who unlawfully deprives another person of his liberty or is 
accessory to such deprivation of liberty shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years. If the deprivation of liberty has lasted for more than one month or has caused any person abnormal 
suffering or serious injury to body or health or has resulted in the death of any person, imprisonment for a 
term of not less than one year shall be imposed.’ Translation from Norwegian by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, found 03.06.03 at the internet: http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-
990424/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
110Case no. 98-3021 M/77 from Oslo City Court (Oslo byrett) 10th of November 1998, p. 7 
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To unlawfully deprive someone of their liberty does not necessarily mean that the 
deprivation must be absolute and insurmountable. It has been presumed in theory that it 
will constitute deprivation of liberty if the victim in order to regain her liberty must 
employ means that one within reason cannot expect her to make use of.111 The Nadia-
case can serve as an illustration of this. To flee from her family and a country may not 
be a 100 per cent impossible, but the court found that the situation she was put in never 
the less constituted deprivation of liberty. 
 
Not just any form of short-term deprivation of liberty is punishable, but there is no 
minimum time-requirement. In Norwegian case law, there are several incidents where 
the deprivation has lasted shorter than one hour.112 It will in my opinion be important to 
look at aspects like the way in which the deprivation was carried out, and how it made 
the victim feel. A deprivation that consists of confiscation of passport and money will 
probably be experienced by the victim (especially if the confiscation lasts only for a 
short period of time) as less infringing than for instance to be drugged or locked up in a 
basement. If the latter means are put to use, this will more easily constitute deprivation 
of liberty after only a short period of time than it would if the first means were used.  
 
The deprivation of liberty has to be unlawful in order for the act to be punishable after 
section 223, i.e. it has to be contrary to a legal norm. The discussion will be the same 
with regards to this section as it was with regards to section 222 (See point 6.2.1.1 on 
‘unlawful conduct’ above.) Parents’ freedom to decide on the upbringing of their 
children gives rise to questions with particular reference to deprivation of liberty. 113 
This does however fall outside the scope of this thesis, as I have excluded children’s 
marriages from my discussion.  
                                                 
111 Bratholm /Matningsdal (1995) p. 521 
112 Bratholm / Matningsdal) (1995)p. 522-523 
113 Parents are to a certain extent allowed to make use of ‘house arrest’, that is to tell their children that 
they are grounded, but there must be a certain proportionality between the means and ends.  (See 
Bratholm/ Matningsdal) Deprivation of liberty past a normal, rational level as part of the raising of 
children is not allowed towards minors. Subsequently is deprivation of the liberty of as a part of a forced 
marriage not allowed neither towards adults nor minors. 
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6.2.4 Threats of Committing a Criminal Act 
The Penal Code section 227 states that threats of committing a criminal act are 
punishable. The conditions are that the criminal act involved in the threat is subject to a 
more severe penalty than six months imprisonment. A father’s threat to his daughter of 
an ‘honour killing’ if she does not marry according to his wishes, will for instance fall 
under the scope of this section. It is not a requirement that is threatened with a specific 
criminal act, cf. the case of Rt. 1996 p. 226. 
 
The threat must be presented under such circumstances that the threat objectively is 
likely to cause serious fear. This is evaluated on the basis of the content of the threat 
seen in relation to the circumstances under which the threat has been presented.114 It is 
not considered vital that a braver person would not have been frightened.115 The fear 
does not necessarily have to be for the life or health of the victim.116  
 
Both words and deeds, including signs117 can be regarded as threats in relation to 
section 227. It is not a prerequisite that the person presenting the threat has to execute 
the criminal act himself,118 and the threat does not have to be presented directly to the 
person who is supposed to be the victim of the criminal act, cf. Rt. 1984, p. 1197. 
 
Unlike with section 222 it is not required that the aggravated party actually felt 
threatened. The father in the example above can still be punished, even if the daughter is 
not threatened by his statements. One can furthermore be punished if the threat is not 
                                                 
114 Norsk Lovkommentar, Matningsdal (2002) p. 106 
115 See the travaux préparatoires, Innst. O. VI (1889) p. 23 
116 Norsk Lovkommentar, Matningsdal (2002), p. 106 
117 Norsk Lovkommentar, Matningsdal (2002) p. 105 
118 Norsk Lovkommentar, Matningsdal (2002p. 105 
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used as a means to an end. A threat of forcing someone into a marriage is thus 
punishable in itself. 
 
Aiding and abetting is also punishable. The sentencing framework is fines or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. If there are especially aggravating 
circumstances, cf. section 232, third sentence, a term of imprisonment not exceeding six 
years may be imposed. The rules of prosecution is the same as with section 222, see 
section 227 second paragraph and the discussion under point 6.2.2. 
 
6.2.5 Punishable Violation of the Formal Requirements of Marriage 
Section 338119 of the Penal Code concerns persons who violate the formal requirements 
of marriage. In relation to forced marriages it is the violation of requirements for a valid 
marriage that is particularly relevant, as one of the requirements is that both persons 
shall enter into the marriage with consent. I will come back to this under the discussion 
of the marriage legislation below. Persons who violate the requirements are liable for 
fines. The degree of guilt is intent, cf. Penal Code section 40. A man who marries a 
woman forced into the matrimony, can thus only be punished if he is aware of the fact 
that she enters into the marriage without consent. 
 
6.2.6 The jurisdiction of the Norwegian state  
In cases of forced marriages it is not unthinkable that the marriage is entered into 
abroad, and that the perpetrators are foreigners. The penal code’s territorial applicability 
is quite wide. Section 12 establishes how far the Norwegian penal law extends. The 
penal law has a wide scope of application. According to section 12 no.1 Norwegian 
penal law applied to acts that are committed in the realm. It makes no difference 
                                                 
119 Penal Code, s. 338:‘Any person who enters into a marriage or partnership pursuant to the Act relating 
to registered partnership without observing the provisions in force concerning the requirements for a valid 
marriage or the requirements for the registration of a partnership, dispensation or other statutory 
conditions, or who is accessory thereto, shall be liable to fines,. 
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whether the perpetrator is a Norwegian or an alien. Penal Code section 12 no. 3 applies 
to acts committed abroad by persons who are Norwegian citizens or are domiciled in 
Norway.  Forced marriages conducted in Norway, by foreigners or Norwegian citizens, 
or forced marriages in other countries, for instance Pakistan, conducted by people who 
have their residence in Norway or who are Norwegian citizens are thus punishable after 
Norwegian law. Both cases are highly possible, but one may also think of other cases, 
where for instance that a Norwegian-Pakistani girl is sent abroad and her Pakistani 
grandfather (domiciled in Pakistan) forces her into a marriage. In those cases, the 
universality principle in Norwegian penal law applies. Section 12 no.4 states the 
principle that Norwegian penal law may also be applied to acts committed abroad by 
foreigners. The condition is that one of the serious offences listed in no. 4 (a) is 
involved. Sections 222, 223 and 227 are listed here, whereas section 338 is not. The 
Pakistani groom of such a marriage conducted in Pakistan can thus not be punished 
pursuant to Norwegian legislation even if he knows that his bride has been forced into 
the marriage. 
 
6.3  Suggested Changes to the Criminal Law 
Subsequent to the follow-up document ‘Efforts against Forced Marriages Spring 
2002’,120 the Government proposed amendments in laws and regulations regarding 
forced marriages. The Ministry of Justice and the Police have presented a green paper 
concerning amendments in the Penal Code.121 An important aim with the suggested 
amendments is that forced marriage cases shall be subject to higher priority from the 
police and the Public Prosecution Office.  
 
                                                 
120 Follow-up document ‘Efforts against forced marriages spring 2002’/ oppfølgingsdokumentet “Innsats 
mot tvangsekteskap våren 2002” found 10.06.03 at the internet: 
http://odin.dep.no/bfd/norsk/publ/handlingsplaner/004021-990048/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
121 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003) 
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6.3.1 Forced Marriage as an Element in the Evaluation of ‘Specially 
Aggravating Circumstances’ 
A clear and effective set of rules is regarded as essential in order to intensify the fight 
against forced marriages. The Ministry wishes on this background to strengthen the 
legal status of those who are victims of forced marriages by making it clearer in the law 
that it is punishable to compel someone into marriage.122 This is suggested done by 
adding forced marriages to the list of what may constitute especially aggravating 
circumstances, cf. the Penal Code section 222, first paragraph and section 232. The 
maximum sentence is higher for felonies conducted under specially aggravating 
circumstances. 
 
To compel someone into marriage may already constitute specially aggravating 
circumstances. In the case concerning forced marriages I referred to under point 6.2.1.1, 
the court stated that the father used force to influence one of the most important choices 
to be made in life. That combined with her weak position due to the violence he had 
subjected her for throughout her childhood, constituted specially aggravating 
circumstances. The legal situation will therefore not change.  
But by mentioning forced marriages in connection to the legal provision, one is sending 
an important signal to the Public Prosecution Office and the Courts stressing the serious 
character of such acts. The hope is that this may contribute to an intensifying of the 
criminal prosecution and to stricter sentencing –not only with acts committed in the 
realm, but also when the compulsion is committed abroad.123 
6.3.2 Unconditional Public Prosecution in Forced Marriage Cases 
As of today public prosecution of a forced marriage case (or a case of threat of forced 
marriage) will only be instituted when requested by the aggrieved person unless it is 
required in the public interest if the felony is committed by the victim’s next-of-kin. I 
stated in point 6.2.2  that it was likely that prosecution would be instituted regardless of 
the victim’s request, since the prosecution of a forced marriage would be of a strong 
                                                 
122 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003), p.8 
123 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003), p.8 
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public interest. The green paper suggests that public prosecution after section 222 and 
227 of the Penal Code from now on shall be unconditional, i.e. the public shall 
prosecute regardless of whether the victim requests prosecution or not. The aim of the 
amendment of the rules regarding public prosecution is to signal that investigation of 
forced marriages shall get a higher priority than it has today. 124  
 
The Ministry points to the fact that it more often than not will be unreasonable to expect 
young people to initiate proceedings after which their family members can be held 
criminally liable. This is in accordance with the suggestions put forward in the report of 
Hennum/Paul, who emphasize that it will be positive to move the responsibility of 
initiating criminal proceedings from the children to the public.125 
 
An amendment of this kind will have a small effect if the Public Prosecution Office 
does not receive knowledge of the forced marriage. But, since the prosecuting authority 
in some cases will get information from other sources than the victims themselves, it 
may not be perceived by the perpetrators as automatically the victim’s fault that 
prosecution is being initiated. This safeguard may also help victims to ‘come forward’ 
and ask for help, since they, once the punishable act has come to the attention of the 
Public Prosecution Office, cannot be pressured into withdrawing their request of 
prosecution.  
 
Many of the bodies entitled to comment on the green paper have called attention to the 
fact that a rule of unconditional public prosecution will have a negative effect on young 
people that would not want prosecution initiated against their parents. They fear that a 
prosecution can ruin further contact between the parents and the daughter, and that 
fewer people will ask for help when they know that they risk that criminal proceedings 
will be initiated against the perpetrators.126 As long as the cases already can be subject 
to prosecution regardless of what the victim requests, and since the rules regarding duty 
                                                 
124 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003), p 22 
125 Hennum/Paul (2000), p.44 
126 Ot.prp. nr.51 (2002-2003) p. 18 
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and right to silence will remain the same as before, the Ministry does not recognize that 
such arguments should be attributed much weight.  
 
6.4 The Marriage Act 
As mentioned above, marriages are -according to Norwegian legislation and treaties 
Norway is bound by- to be entered into freely. The same starting point is set forth in the 
Marriage Act. It is stated in section 11, first paragraph, second sentence that the parties 
shall ‘declare that they wish to contract a marriage with each other’. The Ministry of 
Justice and the Police states in the green paper suggesting changes of the Penal Code 
concerning forced marriages that ‘forced marriages is a grave infringement of the 
individual’s freedom and autonomy’ and that the Marriage Act ‘rests on the basic 
principle that a marriage is to be build on the free will of the parties’ (my 
translation).127This implies that a marriage shall be of free consent. The declaration 
from the two parties is the only formal control of the consent that is carried out in 
connection with the matrimony. 128 
 
There are several conditions that have to be present before two people can get married. 
The conditions are divided into material and formal criteria.  When it comes to material 
conditions (age limits, prohibition to marry close relatives, prohibition for former 
married persons to remarry as long as the first marriage exists etc129) a breach of these 
will be of no relevance to the validity of the marriage. The marriage must then be 
dissolved after the ordinary rules concerning divorce. If, on the other hand, the formal 
criteria (the declaration of consent, the presence of witnesses and both of the intending 
spouses etc.) are violated,  the marriage will be regarded as null and void, cf. section 16.   
                                                 
127 Ot.prp. nr.51 (2002-2003) p.8 
128 Hennum/Rachel (2000) p. 23 
129See: Holmøy/LødrupPeter (2001) p. 39 and following 
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6.4.1 Nullity of Marriage as a Consequence of Compulsion 
The Norwegian Marriage Act section 16, third paragraph provides the opportunity to 
have a marriage declared null and void if one or both of the spouses have been forced 
into the marriage by unlawful conduct. The provision was added in an amendment in 
1994.130  In the White Paper it is pointed out that forced marriages are frequent in many 
cultures and that it also happens to girls born and raised in Norway with parents from 
different cultures.131 The amendment came about because it was regarded desirable to 
spare someone who had been forced into a marriage (with all the unfortunate 
consequences this leads to) and who wanted to get out the strain a separation and a 
divorce would inflict on him or her. This would be especially so in the cultures where 
divorce, particularly for women, is regarded as shameful and stigmatizing. 
6.4.1.1 Compulsion 
The first condition that has to be fulfilled to get a marriage declared void is that 
compulsion has been used. Compulsion can be both physical and psychological and has 
the consequence that the compelled person is made unable to act according to her own 
free will. As with the general clause against illegal use of force, one has to draw a line 
between forced and arranged marriages. (Se discussion above, point  66.2.4.2.’To 
Compel) 
 
6.4.1.2 Unlawful use of force 
In addition to the fact that there must have been compulsion, the use of force must have 
been ‘unlawful’. It must normally be a condition that the compulsion must have been 
able to cause grave fear.132 Holmøy/Lødrup state that in the evaluation of this, one needs 
to consider the cultural environment in which the victim has grown up. Hennum/Paul 
interpret this to mean that, in groups where family has a stronger control over the 
                                                 
130 Endringslov av 24.juni 1994 nr.24 
131 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (1993-94), p. 12 
132Holmøy/Lødrup (2001) p. 95 
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individuals, one will tolerate a somewhat stronger pressure than in groups where such 
control is weaker.133  
 
In my opinion one should not attach great importance to a cultural relativist argument 
like this one. The tradition for use of pressure within certain groups should not be of 
relevance when one is to decide what constitutes unlawful use of force according to 
Norwegian law. If the provision is practiced like that, it will create a situation where the 
law is interpreted differently depending on which cultural group the perpetrator belongs 
to.  It is a basic principle that everyone is to be equal before the law. It is the 
determination of the word ‘unlawful’ that must be central here. The pressure is either 
unlawful subsequent to Norwegian law or it is not. The line can be hard to draw, and 
one may have to do so on a case-to-case basis. But the fact that some cultural groups 
pressure their children more than others cannot influence the content of the word 
‘unlawful’ so that these parents get more leeway when it comes to using compulsion 
than other parents do. 
 
The condition that the conduct has to be ‘unlawful’ is of highest relevance when it 
comes to psychological compulsion. It will normally be here that the boarderline cases 
arise. The word ‘unlawful’ is a somewhat wider term in relation to section 16, paragraph 
3 of the Marriage Act than it is in relation to section 222 of the Penal Code. It has been 
stated134 that compulsion is unlawful when it is ‘manifestly unacceptable’135. Threats of 
psychological and social sanctions will be relevant here, thus it is not necessarily a 
condition that acts that are sanctioned by civil or penal law constitute the threat. We see 
here that it takes less to get a marriage declared null and void than it does to get the 
perpetrators of the compulsion punished. The travaux préparatoires leave it up to the 
courts to draw the line between unlawful compulsion and lawful pressure. As the line 
between the forced marriages and the marriages where the pressure has not been big 
                                                 
133 Holmøy/Lødrup(2001) p. 95, cf.  Hennum/ Paul (2000), p. 27 
134 Holmøy/Lødrup(2001) p. 95 
135 ‘Manifestly unacceptable’ is my own translation of the term ‘klart utilbørlig’ which is used in the legal 
commentary to the law. 
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enough to ‘activate’ the law will be drawn differently depending on which law one 
wishes to apply, I will argue that this is a way of operating with a differentiated notion 
of forced marriages.  
 
6.4.1.3 Procedural rules 
According to section 16, paragraph 3 the marriage is not void until the courts have 
pronounced a declaratory judgment stating that the marriage is void. The legal 
proceedings must be instituted by one of the spouses. This has to be done within 6 
months after the spouse is free from the compulsion, and at least within five years after 
the marriage was entered into, cf. section 16, paragraph 4.  The absolute ‘deadline’ 
corresponds to the period of limitation for punishment after section 222. The reason for 
the relatively short period of limitation is consideration for the parties themselves, 
possible children and evidential difficulties.  If there are no distinct indications that the 
compulsion has ceased to be found, is it the five year long period of limitation that must 
apply. In a case (RG 1999 p.449 -Fredrikstad) where a woman born in Somalia who had 
lived in Norway since the age of nine and was wed in Yemen against her will, the 
compulsion was perceived to have ceased when she returned to Norway. (See below on 
the possibility of extension of the period of limitation due to customary law.) 
 
6.4.1.4 Territorial applicability  
At least one of the spouses must have domicile or be a Norwegian citizen when the 
legal proceedings are instituted, cf. the Dispute Act section 419 litra a. If the marriage is 
entered into in the home country of the parents, but the compelled woman has domicile 
in Norway (and perhaps a Norwegian citizenship as well), it is the Norwegian 
legislation that determines the conditions of marriage.136  
 
If the victim has domicile outside the borders of Norway, and the wedding took place 
there, the situation is more uncertain. According to Norwegian international private law 
                                                 
136 Holmøy/Lødrup (2001), p. 96 and Thue ( 2001) p. 294 
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the main rule is that questions concerning the validity of the marriage are decided 
according to the laws of the country where the wedding took place.137  If a marriage is 
considered valid there, is it only in exceptional cases that it will be considered not valid 
in Norway. However, this is only the case as concerns of the validity of the marriage. 
Questions relating to separation and divorce are settled according to Norwegian rules 
for couples domiciled in Norway.  
 
In regards to Pakistan, the question on the validity of forced marriages according to 
national legislation does not hold much relevance, since a forced marriage is not to be 
regarded valid after Pakistani law, either. A Pakistani woman living in Pakistan when 
being forced into marriage will according to Shari’a be in a marriage that shall be 
regarded void (see chapter on Pakistan ).And even if she fails to get recognition for the 
fact that her forced marriage is void in Pakistan, she can, if domiciled in Norway after 
the wedding, get the marriage declared null and void (provided that the prerequisites 
stated above are present).  In the case printed in RG 1999 p.449 stated the court state 
that although there were doubts to whether the marriage is valid according to the law of 
Yemen or not, this was unnecessary to look into since the marriage would still be 
declared null and void after the Norwegian Marriage Act.138 But, as I will come back to 
later, refusing to recognize a forced marriage from Pakistan on the grounds that it is not 
valid after Norwegian law, may be a measure to try out with regards to family 
reunification cases. 
 
6.4.1.5 Exceptions after the ordre public-rule 
The rules governing the use of the laws of other countries are not absolute. The 
Norwegian ordre public-rule will in some cases be applicable as an exception before the 
courts. This customary rule is based upon the idea that some actions are irreconcilable 
with the legal order and contrary to basic ethical or social values.139 It has been 
                                                 
137 See the decision in Rt. 1977 s. 715 at p. 722 
138 RG. 1999 p. 449 on p. 450. 
139 For further information on ordre public, see: Lundgaard(2000) p.99-199 
  70 
emphasized that the ordre public-rule shall only be applied in exceptional cases where 
there are strong reasons140 for it.  
 
The ordre public-rule was applied in a case where a bigamist second marriage was set 
aside, even though it was valid after the laws in the home country of the parties 
(Bangladesh).141 It was argued in the judgment that a divorce would in any way be 
treated according to Norwegian law, and that an annulment of marriage bears a striking 
resemblance to a divorce. Conclusive for the outcome was the point that ‘a polygamous 
marriage that cannot be annulled could in no way fit in with the Norwegian legal order.  
 
The Ministry of Children and Family Affairs assumed that the same could apply in 
cases were a forced marriage has taken place abroad, and where the parties moved to 
Norway within the period of limitation. 142 The assumption has neither been confirmed 
nor rejected by the courts as there have been no cases concerning this tried before them, 
so the conclusion is therefore uncertain. Several remarks can be made. First of all, a 
void marriage does not have as many similarities with a divorce as an annulment of 
marriage. (The institution ‘annulment of marriage’ no longer exists in Norway). 
Secondly, it is not necessarily so that the upholding of a forced marriage is as 
inconsistent with the Norwegian legal order as the upholding of a polygamous marriage.  
 
Nevertheless, as forced marriages infringe deeply on the right to freedom and personal 
liberty, it is in my opinion clear that such an institution must be contrary to the legal 
order and the general opinion of what the law is and ought to be.  A forced marriage is 
by definition not voluntarily entered into, whereas the nature of a polygamous marriage 
does not automatically contain the same elements of compulsion.143  At the very least 
must the marriage be void pursuant to ordre public-considerations when the use of force 
                                                 
140  The Norwegian term that normally is used is ‘tungtveiende grunner’. 
141 Rt. 1977 s. 715 
142 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (1993-94) p. 13 
143 For polygynous procreative marriage arrangements, see Hellum (1999) 
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in question is punishable. One might think that the situation could be different in cases 
were section 16, third paragraph of the Marriage Act was violated, but where the 
compulsion is not punishable. It is however a strong argument for the courts to consider 
that the Ministry in its White Paper assumes that also these cases are to be void after the 
ordre public-rule. The travaux préparatoires are according to the Norwegian doctrine an 
important source of law.144 The idea that marriages entered into abroad under unlawful 
compulsion would be inconsistent with the Norwegian ordre public-rule is also 
maintained in legal theory.145  Such a rule would furthermore be easier to sustain.  It can 
in my opinion subsequently be concluded with good reason that the ordre public-rule 
must apply to all forced marriages. 
 
Thue maintains that the ordre public-rule may be applicable in the case of forced 
marriages also after the period of limitation is expired, even if the marriage otherwise 
does not fall under the scope of section 16, third paragraph.146 This assumption is, 
however, uncertain. It may seem as though the Norwegian Parliament meant section 16, 
3rd and 4th paragraph, to exhaustively govern the period of limitation (during which 
one must initiate a lawsuit) in cases of forced marriages. 
 
6.4.1.6 Consequences of a nullity 
The declaration of a marriage as null and void has implications for the future as well as 
retroactively. The marriage is not, and has never been, valid. The parties will thus be in 
a different position legally than after a divorce or after an annulment by the old rules. 
They will, after the judgment is final, be considered unmarried rather that divorced. The 
rules in chapter 16 of the Marriage Act concerning maintenance and spouse’s pension 
after a divorce will not apply to void marriages. The parties will after the marriage is 
declared null and void by the court be able to demand that all assets are split according 
to the special regulation in section 57 litra d in the Marriage Act. A void marriage may 
                                                 
144 For more information on the sources of law, see Eckhoff/Helgesen, (1997) 
145 Thue (2001), p.295 and Hennum/Paul(2000) p. 29 
146 Thue (2001), p.295 
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also have consequences in relation to any children of the marriage. Such questions are 
resolved after the paternity rules in the Children Act. 
6.5 Suggested Amendments to the Marriage Act 
The Government has subsequent to the follow-up document ‘Efforts against Forced 
Marriages Spring 2002’147 suggested amendments in laws and regulations regarding 
forced marriages. Some of these amendments are to be incorporated into the Marriage 
Act. 
 
6.5.1 Mandatory examination of conditions for marriage by public authorities 
One suggestion is to introduce mandatory examination of the conditions for marriage 
executed by public authorities.  Today, it is the persons with authorization to solemnize 
the marriage that conducts the control. The Ministry refers to Hennum/Paul148 who in 
their report (p.48-49) state that today’s control sometimes seem to be unsatisfactory –
being solely in the hands of the individual officer authorized to solemnize the marriage. 
  
If public authorities are to assume responsibility for the control, one avoids possible 
conflicts of interest on the part of the person conducting the ceremony, as he or she will 
not be torn between demands of the religious community and of the state in relation to 
the formal requisites for marriage. This can be of relevance in connection with forced 
marriages, as one may imagine that the person conducting the ceremony may become 
aware of the fact that the marriage is not of free and full consent, but will feel the 
pressure of the community present at the wedding not to protest. The Ministry states 
several reasons for the suggested amendment (see the green paper/discussion document 
                                                 
147 Follow-up document ‘Efforts against forced marriages spring 2002’/ oppfølgingsdokumentet “Innsats 
mot tvangsekteskap våren 2002” found 10.06.03 at the internet: 
http://odin.dep.no/bfd/norsk/publ/handlingsplaner/004021-990048/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
148 Hennum/ Paul(2000) p.48-49 
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section 3149) including the hope that such an arrangement will decrease the number of 
forced marriages entered into in Norway.  
 
In my opinion, there are not many negative aspects of an introduction of mandatory 
examination of the conditions for marriage executed by public authorities. The Ministry 
points to the fact that the arrangement is non-discriminatory in the sense that everyone 
who wishes to get married will have to abide by the same rules. Chances are that some 
forced marriage-situations will get intercepted if such control is to be conducted through 
interviews with (or at least through appearance before the control institution by) the 
intending spouses. However, it is my belief that the effects of such a change will not be 
revolutionary, as it is unlikely that a person who feels compelled into a marriage will 
tell this to a control institution. That would in most cases be the equivalent of saying no 
to the marriage –and that is exactly what she or he feels unable to do.  
 
6.5.1.1 How to Conduct the Examination of the Conditions of Marriage 
As with every other form of public control of the voluntariness of marriages -either the 
discussion of public prosecution (see discussion above), the discussion on the County 
Governor’s standing to sue subsequent to section 16(3) of the Marriage Act (see point 
6.5.2 below), or the interviews conducted in relation to family reunification applications 
(see point 6.6)- the main task must be to provide a safe haven where the possible 
victims feel safe enough to come forward and ask for help and protection. Since the 
perpetrators often are related to the victims, it will in many cases be hard for the victims 
to publicly protest against the marriage. One thing is to wish to prevent the forced 
marriage from happening, another altogether is to risk alienation from for your parents 
and close relatives. In the Nadia-case, professor of social anthropology Unni Wikan 
testified that within Islam it is unheard of for a child to do anything that can harm the 
mother, almost no matter what the mother has done.150   
                                                 
149 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): Forslag til endringer i ekteskapsloven om inngåelse 
og oppløsning av ekteskap (lov 4.juli 1991 nr. 47 om ekteskap), June 2002, by the Ministry of Children 
and Family Affairs, p.5 and following 
150 Case no. 98-3021 M/77 from Oslo City Court (Oslo byrett) 10th of November 1998, p.6 
  74 
 
A possible procedure can be that the two intending spouses must appear in front of the 
controlling institution separately, and that the controlling institution is given the 
opportunity to investigate the case on its own. In such a procedure, if the controlling 
institution discovers any irregularities during an interview with an intending spouse, it 
has the opportunity to investigate further. In such a set up the implication is that it does 
not necessarily have to be one of the spouses that has informed the control institution 
and thus ‘ratted on’ her family. Even if the victim informs the controlling institution of 
the reality of the marriage, the controlling institution may investigate further and 
perhaps base its decision on other findings than the victim’s testimony. This would give 
the decision an air of neutrality, separated from the testimony of the victim. 
 
An arrangement where the institution is in a position where it can investigate does, 
however, raise some doubts. First of all is it not stated in the green paper/discussion 
document that the Ministry envisages such an increase in the thoroughness of the 
control.151 The control is suggested put with the national register, with the courts or with 
the two of them in combination.152 Neither the national register nor the courts are 
equipped for the investigation of these kinds of cases and it is also important to 
remember that the right to marriage, too, is a human right (see section 2 above). 
Thorough investigation may impede the fulfillment of the right to marry. An eager 
investigation may also risk being discriminatory in practice, if groups the controlling 
institution believes to be in particular danger of forced marriages are submitted to a 
scrutiny other groups avoid being subject to.  
 
                                                 
151 The Ministry of Children and Family Affairs informed upon request (10.06.03)over the phone that the 
final draft  is expected to be presented in a green paper in the end of June 2003. 
152 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): Forslag til endringer i ekteskapsloven om inngåelse 
og oppløsning av ekteskap (lov 4.juli 1991 nr. 47 om ekteskap), June 2002, by the Ministry of Children 
and Family Affairs, p.16 
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On the other hand, a forced marriage constitutes a grave violation of human rights and 
this does of course have to be held up against the individual’s right to non-
discrimination. An investigation of this kind is in itself not a very intrusive procedure 
compared with the severe implications a forced marriage with all its violations of 
human rights will have for a victim. There are no statistics available on the subject, but 
research has shown that minority youth belonging to certain groups are at the risk of 
being forced into marriages. If such youths are to be subject to additional investigation 
when the controlling institution on the basis of the interviews deems it necessary, this 
will represent a degree of government interference that is defendable when the aim is to 
prevent forced marriages. The differential treatment would have a justifiable basis. 
 
6.5.1.2 Information to the Parties if the Conditions Are Not Met 
A denial of marriage based on the fact that the conditions for marriage are not met by 
the parties will influence greatly the right to marry. It is regarded as an important legal 
safeguard that individuals are to receive an account of the grounds on which decisions 
concerning the individual citizen are made. Mistakes can be made and a couple denied 
their right to marry must be allowed to know why. The problem with such a justification 
of the decision made by the controlling institution is that it faces the risk of singling out 
one of the spouses as the informant and cause for the denial. If it really is a case of 
forced marriage, and the victim has been subject to threats of unlawful conduct, the 
consequences can be severe.  
 
The discussion will be the same as with the establishment of unconditional public 
prosecution in cases concerning the Penal Code section 222, or the right to be informed 
on the grounds for denial of application for family reunification. Even though the 
discussion contains the same elements and arguments, the weight of each argument may 
weigh differently from field to field. An infringement of the right to marry deserves a 
written justification. If the controlling institution is given the authority to investigate on 
its own, it is my opinion that the grounds for denial can be formulated without going 
into the testimony of the victim. If there is suspicion of such a serious crime as a forced 
marriage, a refusal may be justified simply by stating that there is a fear of a forced 
marriage and by pointing to indications that have come up during the investigation. If 
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both parties really wish to get married, they can have their case tried again –just like 
one, if denied marriage on the grounds that one is not properly divorced from the first 
spouse, can apply again when the divorce is final.  
 
It is difficult to see that the risk of falsely perceiving a marriage as forced is very big. 
The Centre for Combating Ethnic Discrimination stresses that the institution that is 
given the authority to examine the conditions for marriage should have adequate 
competence on cultural and religious issues, so that it does not confuse for instance an 
arranged marriage with a forced marriage.153 Weighed  against the advantage it will be 
to prevent even just one forced marriage, it is clear to me that a mandatory examination 
of the conditions for marriage executed by public authorities is an unproblematic and 
desired measure in the struggle to end forced marriages 
 
6.5.2 The County Governors’ Standing to Sue Subsequent to Section 16(3) 
As of today, it is only the spouses that can go to court in order to establish that the 
marriage as null or void, cf. Dispute Act section 417, first paragraph. The Ministry of 
Children and Family Affairs has sent a green paper on a hearing round154 suggesting 
that the County Governors’ right to institute legal proceedings with a view of getting a 
marriage declared null and void shall be reinstated. The County Governor previously 
had such standing subsequent to the then section 417 forth paragraph of the Dispute 
Act.   
 
The suggested amendment is meant to serve a number of purposes155 including the 
empowerment of the County Governor’s jurisdiction in cases of forced marriages. One 
hopes that the County Governor’s ability to institute legal proceedings on this matter 
may provide relief to victims of forced marriages that do not themselves feel strong 
                                                 
153 The Centre for Combating Ethnic Discrimination, Comments to Green Paper. Can be found at internet 
(11.06.03): http://www.smed.no/artikkelID.asp?artikkelID=202 
154 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document) 
155 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document), p.17-19 
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enough to take the cases to court. The Ministry emphasises that in order for this to offer 
remedy to victims of forced marriages, it is essential that information about the fact that 
the County Governor has legal standing in these cases reaches the ones who are 
compelled into marriage.  
 
6.5.2.1 Who Should Be Able to Provide The Governor With Information Concerning 
Forced Marriages? 
The suggestion invites treflection regarding the question of whether it should be 
possible for others –and in that case, who- to provide the County Governor with 
information about the occurrence of forced marriages. The Ministry requested 
comments on this in the responses to the green paper/discussion document. In my 
opinion, it must at least be possible for private persons to supply the County Governors 
with information if they have friends or relatives being subjected to a forced marriage. 
The case may be different when other public institutions with a duty of confidentiality, 
for instance medical personnel, are involved. The reasons why such institutions (in most 
cases) cannot render information to the police regarding crime they receive knowledge 
of in connection with their work will apply in these cases as well. Reporting knowledge 
of forced marriages to the police will have different consequences from the reporting to 
a public office where only civil sanctions will come into play, but the two options have 
in common that they may entail extensive consequences for the involved parties. 
(Criminal charges may be pressed, or a marriage may be considered never entered into –
see chapter 6 concerning the substantial content of different provisions concerning 
forced marriage) The justification for a similar rule for the duty of confidentiality when 
it comes to rendering information to the County Governors will have the best of 
grounds.  
 
6.6 Family Reunification  
Persons living in Norway or persons who intend to reside here permanently are in some 
cases allowed to have their family members come and live with them in Norway. The 
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rules regarding such family reunification are set forth in the Immigration Act156 and the 
immigration regulations157. According to section 9 of the Immigration Act, permission 
for family reunification is granted to close family members of the person resident in 
Norway, such as the spouse (cf. the immigrant regulations section 23). If the 
requirements stated in the law are fulfilled, the person thus has a right to family 
reunification. The persons who wish to come to Norway must apply for family 
reunification from their country of origin (or the country in which they have resided for 
the past six months) cf. the immigration regulations section10, 1st paragraph, and the 
Immigration Act section 6, 4th paragraph. The applicants must themselves submit an 
application to the nearest Norwegian embassy or consulate. 158 
  
6.6.1 The Prerequisite of Ensured Subsistence 
As a general rule subsistence must be ensured before family reunification is granted, cf. 
the Immigration Act section 9. Further regulations are given in the immigration 
regulations which in section 25, 1st paragraph, state that a prerequisite of ensured 
subsistence has to be met in order for a family reunification to be granted.  The 
subsistence is subsequent to section 25, 2nd paragraph, ‘deemed to be ensured when the 
applicant satisfies the conditions pursuant to § 19, when the principal person can 
maintain the applicant through the provisions of § 19 or through a combination’. In 
short, the evaluation of whether the prerequisite has been met is carried out by looking 
at the gross subsistence of both the applicant and the principal person. The minimum 
                                                 
156 Unofficial translation in english by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development can 
be found at the internet (12.06.03): http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19880624-064-eng.doc 
157 Unofficial translation in english by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development can 
be found at the internet (12.06.03): http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/for-19901221-1028-eng.doc 
158 Fact sheet from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. found on the internet (12.06.03): 
http://www.udi.no/dokumenter/pdf/Faktaark/VisumEngelsk%202.pdf 
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total income is set to salary grade number one at the Government wage scale which  in 
2002 amounted to 161 000 NOK.159  
 
Section 19 establishes what constitutes subsistence. Income from employment, pensions 
and other periodical payments, own capital and for instance students loans –separately 
or in combination may found the basis for fulfilment of the prerequisite of subsistence. 
Subsistence may also in exceptional cases be ensured by a financial guarantee put up by 
a third party, cf. immigration regulations section 19, 5th paragraph. 
 
It is possible to make exceptions to the prerequisite of subsistence when the applicant is 
the spouse of a Norwegian national resident in the realm, or where other particularly 
strong humanitarian considerations so indicate, cf. the immigration regulations section 
25, 3rd paragraph. The use of the ‘exception clause’ is at present practiced quite 
liberally, so that the main rule for the spouse of a Norwegian national living in Norway 
is that no prerequisite concerning subsistence needs to be met. 160 
 
 
6.7 Amendments Concerning the Prerequisite of Ensured Subsistence 
A measure which has been suggested in Norway is to change the provisions in the 
Immigration Act concerning the prerequisite of subsistence when applying for family 
reunification on the grounds of marriage. This measure is meant both to minimize the 
occurrence of forced marriages, as well as making it easier on those who actually 
become victims.  
 
                                                 
159 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 
annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development , p. 3 
160 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 
annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development , p. 2 
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It is at present possible to obtain dispensation from the prerequisite of ensured 
subsistence also when the applicant is under 23 years of age and has Norwegian 
citizenship, and the Government is proposing that that practice be changed.161 The green 
paper proposes that as a main rule subsistence is to be required when one of the spouses 
is under the age of 23, that the duty of subsistence should be with the Norwegian 
resident alone, and that financial guarantees put up by a third party is not to be regarded 
as subsistence. 
 
As a high number of the forced marriages in Norway are between one spouse living in 
Norway and another from the Norwegian victim’s country of origin162, one sees that a 
marriage often serves as an ‘entrance ticket’ into Norway for the spouse from the 
developing country. Unni Wikan points out how a Norwegian-Pakistani girl can secure 
her future husband from Pakistan residence- and work permit in Norway, and that 
through that, the marriage becomes a migration strategy. 163 It is hoped that the 
prerequisite of being able to give maintenance to the spouse, i.e. having a steady income 
over a decided minimum limit, would prevent young people from being forced into 
marriage, as there would be little or no point in a marriage if the two spouses could not 
reunite in the developing country. One imagines that this would give the young people 
chance to finish school, and maybe even get additional education, before being married 
off, since they would need a job and an income in order to qualify for family 
reunification on the grounds of marriage.  
 
There is no doubt that brides and grooms in a developing country would appear to be a 
lot less attractive if they could not get his or her spouse into the country. Most of the 
forced marriages involving Norwegians are entered into abroad, in the victims’ country 
                                                 
161 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 
annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development , p. 2 
162 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document), p.1 
163 Wikan(1995) p.117 
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of origin164, and with a regulation like this, it is reasonable to expect that the Norwegian 
spouses will avoid being held in their country of origin until the family reunification 
permission is granted. This is something that often happens in these cases with the 
regulations we have to day, especially if the Norwegian is a girl/woman, since in the 
cultures that practice forced marriages normally it is expected that the bride shall move 
to her family-in-law’s home.  
 
If the prevention of forced marriages has failed, it is at least a considerable advantage 
for Norwegian authorities wishing to help the victim out of the distressed situation, that 
the victim is situated in Norway. One will then have qualified help at hand, one is in a 
position to provide alternative housing facilities in the form of shelters or similar 
facilities and most importantly –there will be no problems concerning jurisdiction.  
 
Underlying the suggested amendment is the assumption that the younger the parties are, 
the harder it is for them to resist pressure from their families. An arranged marriage 
between young people may thus easily become a forced marriage in reality. The 
Ministry hopes to reduce the pressure on young people with regard to marriage.165 It is 
also possible that there will be fewer forced marriages if one manages to raise the 
marriage age, as older girls are more likely not only to be able to protest, but to get 
heard than the younger ones are. If the worst comes to the worst, they may also have a 
stronger network of contacts, and may therefore more easily be in a position to handle a 
break with their families. Asma Jahangir166, the lawyer who defended Saima Waheed, 
                                                 
164 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 
annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development , p. 1 
165 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document), p. 2 
166 Ms. Jahangir is a leading human rights lawyer and activist both in her home country and 
internationally, and recipient of inter alia The University of Oslo's Human Rights Award, The Lisl and 
Leo Eitinger Prize 2002.  
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points out that although a break with the family may be painful, the pain of being forced 
into marriage may well be bigger.167 
 
Regardless of the many possible positive aspects of this suggestion, it does, however, 
fail to take into account that a prerequisite of income may have as a result that children 
are taken out of high school or other studies earlier in order to get a job and reach the 
minimum income limit as soon as possible. Bredal’s findings seem to indicate that the 
girls interviewed are of the opinion that they would have to do everything in the 
beginning, to give up education, start working as well as doing  all the housework.168 
Due to the low average marriage age of Pakistani women in Norway, most of them must 
have been unable to finish higher education before the marriage.  In the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESC), the right to education 
is embedded in article 13. This does not grant the right to a high school, as it only 
stipulates that primary education shall be ‘available (…) to all’ (litra a), but the article 
does also in its litra c state that ‘(h)igher education shall be made equally accessible to 
all (…), by every appropriate means’.  Such a law will, if the potential consequences 
outlined above should come into effect, lead to a practice where higher education will 
be harder to achieve for children with parents that believe in early marriages.  
 
Being taken out of school will marginalize the victim’s position in a number of ways; 
the social network will come to consist almost solely of family members, it may lead to 
her standing on the side of the Norwegian society, and it will certainly diminish the 
victim’s career opportunities. All of the above may again lead to a lower level of 
integration and participation in the Norwegian society. It will also make her more 
exposed to forced marriages, and less capable of protesting against an unwanted 
marriage. When contact with others is limited to contact with the family members that 
are exercising the pressure/coercion, it will seem hard or even impossible to find a way 
out, as one will have no one to go to but to strangers representing a majority society 
                                                 
167 Stated in a speech at a lunch seminar at the Institute of Women’s Law, University of Oslo, the 30th of 
October 2002 
168 Bredal (1998), p.31 
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culture oneself is not an integrated part of. If taken out of school too early, one may not 
even know of the alternatives that actually exist. When a victim is in such a 
marginalized position, the threshold for what constitutes a forced marriage may be 
lower than in other situations. The possible wrath of the family towards a person that 
objects to his or her imminent marriage will have greater consequences for a young 
person in this situation than for a well-integrated youth with a strong social network.  
 
It is also quite reasonable to predict that this will affect girls to a larger degree than 
boys. In the traditional cultures that practice forced marriages, the man is looked upon 
as the main provider of the family, whereas the woman is supposed to take care of the 
home and family –often being subordinated to the man, given the view that he is the 
head of the family. In the family reunification cases where the husband is brought to 
Norway from another country, it will still be his duty to provide for the family, so ‘all’ 
that the girl has to do is to work until she fulfils the prerequisite of maintenance. After 
the husband is settled and has got a job, he will then be able to take over the 
responsibility of providing for the family.  
 
It will in these cases be logical to prioritise the boys’ education over that of the girls’, 
since the girls will end up as housewives anyway. According to this line of reasoning, it 
will be preferable to get the husband over to Norway as soon as possible –and the way 
to achieve this is by taking the girl out of school and letting her start working. In the 
reversed situation, where the boy is in Norway and the bride is brought in from another 
country, it will appear more reasonable to see to it that the boy gets a ‘proper’ 
education, as that will enable him to earn more money, which is important for someone 
with a responsibility to provide for a whole family.  
 
According to article 5a of the CEDAW, Norway is obligated to ‘modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women’ in order to eliminate practices based on 
‘stereotyped roles for men and women’. Norway furthermore has a duty to ‘take all 
measures (…) to modify or abolish (…) regulations (…) and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women’ after article 2f of the CEDAW. Given the results 
stipulated above, such a rule may be hard to justify according to the CEDAW. But on 
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the other hand, the Government has a margin of appreciation when it comes to deciding 
what measures it chooses to apply. It is furthermore of the utmost importance to combat 
forced marriages, as these too are based on stereotyped versions of man and woman. 
Forced marriages are a huge encroachment on the freedom of the victims and have vast 
consequences for their whole lives. One has to make an overall evaluation and measure 
the positive impact such a law may have against the negative impact it may have on 
others. Given the fact that forced marriages are so cruel to the victims, and while the 
possible negative impact is as uncertain as it is, it is justifiable to try and see whether 
such a proposal can contribute to saving some from this plight. It is also important to 
keep in mind that if girls are taken out of school and set to work to early, both the girls 
themselves and the schools may react and make use of some of the relief measures that 
exists. Still, it is important that the Government recognises that a law like this may have 
unforeseeable consequences for the involved parties, and that even though it may help 
some, it may marginalize others, and increase the risk of forced marriages for them –and 
at an earlier age than before, with them being more isolated and alone, and thus more 
vulnerable and unable to get out of the situation, than they otherwise would have been. 
Measures to remedy the situation for these victims must also be at hand. 
 
The Ministry recognises the risk associated with the suggested amendment, but points 
out that it will be possible to study and still fulfil the prerequisite of subsistence, since a 
student loan can form a part of the subsistence. The risk that young people are taken out 
of school is not regarded as big enough to justify the departure from a proposal that has 
so many positive aspects, as a student on a student loan and with an after-school part-
time job will have the opportunity to fulfil the prerequisite of subsistence.  
 
The Ministry still wants to keep the general exemption for cases where particularly 
strong humanitarian considerations indicate that permission for family reunification is 
to be given even if the subsistence prerequisite is not met. It is however emphasised that 
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the wording must be interpreted strictly, reserving the exception clause for truly 
extraordinary cases.169 
 
6.7.1 The Application Process 
If the marriage that constitutes the basis of the application for family reunification is 
forced, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration states that the marriage will be 
regarded null and void after the ordre public rules.170  As the Immigration Act is a 
rights-based law providing the right to family reunification, the grounds for the denial 
of the application must be stated. That presupposes that the reasons for denial are secret. 
If not, the victim will easily be identified as the saboteur/informer to the Government. 
On the other hand, such a suggestion calls for some legal doubt. Without an open 
bureaucracy in these cases it will be hard to uphold an impression of the decision 
making as unbiased and fair. Openness in the decision making process is an important 
legal safeguard to prevent arbitrariness. Furthermore the consequences of a wrongful 
refusal of granting family reunification will largely affect the family concerned, and 
come into conflict with the right to family life that we find in all major international 
human rights treaties. The assessment will be the same as after the chapter on 
mandatory examinations of the conditions for marriage. But whereas a wrongful 
decision in that context would amount to a delay before the marriage could be entered 
into, a wrongful decision in family reunification cases will result in the married couple 
having to stay in different countries until a possible new family reunification application 
is accepted. Mr. Bjøranger at the UDI is of the opinion that the applicants and their 
family in case of a denial would point the finger at the victim of the forced marriages 
regardless of whether the grounds for refusal were confidential.171 When the effect of 
such a measure is so unlikely to be efficient, the consideration of the proportionality 
                                                 
169 Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): ’Forslag til endringer i utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 
annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development , p. 3 
170 Conversation over the phone 12.06.03 with Terje Bjøranger from the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration. 
171 Conversation with Mr. Bjøranger 13.06.03 
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principle leads to the conclusion that refusal to give grounds for denial is too far-
reaching and can thus not be accepted. 
6.8 Visa while Waiting for the Family Reunification Application to Be 
Processed 
Due to the unreasonable long period of time involved in dealing with family 
reunification cases, a visa (visa type: D) was introduced, granting the applicant 
permission to stay in Norway with his or her family while the application is processed. 
Pursuant to Section 106 second paragraph of the Immigration Regulations, the 
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration determines whether a foreign national who falls 
under Section 23 (a) of the Immigration Regulations and requests family reunification 
with his or her spouse may be granted a long-term national visa (visa type: D).  
 
Such a visa enables its holder to travel to Norway, provided that when the spouse is a 
Norwegian national or a foreign national residing in Norway with a settlement permit, 
or any permit that may constitute a basis for a settlement permit or an individual permit. 
It is a condition according to circular UDI 01-16 JURA Case No.: 96/389 that both 
parties must be over the age of 18 unless the marriage was entered into in Norway. It is 
a condition that the spouses shall live together. If the conditions are met, Visa type D 
shall be granted if there is no specific information which indicates that there is a need to 
verify the documents in connection with the processing of the application for a work or 
residence permit, cf. the circular p.2. 
 
The Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad often experiences that young women come to the 
Embassy together with her family applying for a visa to Norway on the grounds of 
family reunification, seemingly eager to get the application granted –only to contact the 
Embassy later without the presence of their family and begging them not to grant the 
visa, as they have been married off against their will and do not want a family 
reunification with the spouse. Similarly, the Embassy gets frequent phone calls from 
Norwegian citizens that urge them not to grant this or that Pakistani citizen a visa as the 
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application for family reunification is based on a forced marriage between the Pakistani 
and the Norwegian citizen.172  
 
 
6.8.1 Possible Amendments 
A forced marriage is grounds enough not to grant a visa, and could have been a good 
way to provide remedy in numerous forced marriages. The only problem is that –since 
the Norwegian visa-regulations leave no room for discretion, and you are entitled to a 
visa if you fulfil the prerequisites stipulated in the regulations- anyone who gets his or 
her visa-application denied is entitled to a written explanation of the grounds for the 
denial. The young people that contact the Embassy may have different citizenships, but 
they all have one thing in common: They do not want their requests for a visa-denial to 
be made public, as this will be the same as openly resisting the marriage-with the grave 
consequences this may have for them personally. 
 
The Embassy –and the youths at risk- e then left only with the hope that there is 
something else wrong with the applicaistion. In some cases one is ‘lucky’ and finds 
errors in some of the formal prerequisites that need to be met. This may delay the 
process, enable the Norwegian citizen to return to Norway and leave room for him or 
her to find alternatives and possibly get help. But the Embassy’s experience is that most 
of the applicants know far too well how to draw up the application without flaws. The 
population of ‘Little Norway’ districts of Pakistan have very close ties to the Pakistani 
population in Norway and are set on keeping it that way.173 
 
A denial to a visa application could provide a way out of the forced marriage for the 
victim. Coming to Norway alone gives the victim some time to consider, and make use 
of the available means (family-mediation, shelters, NGOs, police etc) in order to ‘break 
free’ of the marriage. In Pakistan, the women will have no means of getting out of her 
                                                 
172 Coversation with Mr. Bjøranger from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 13.06.03 
173 Conversation with Mr. Bjøranger  from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 13.06.03 
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plight, as she would have practically no where to go. But in Norway, where the system 
of support is better she may find a way out of the difficult situation. Still, chances are 
that even though the reasons for denial are not stated it will be possible to point out the 
victim as the one who has ‘ratted’ to the Government. Norwegian Embassies have 
experienced just this.174 Another measure would be to stop the use of Visas type D. 
They were introduced due to long waiting periods for the assessment of family 
reunification application. The waiting period is now a lot shorter175 and the raison d’être 
for this kind of visa is no longer present.   
6.9  Conclusive Remarks 
I have in by discussion of the different provisions above argued that the requirement 
‘unlawful’ is a somewhat wider term in relation to the Marriage Act than it is in relation 
the Penal Code. It is my opinion that the differentiated term ‘unlawful’ shows a way of 
operating with a differentiated concept of forced marriages. As I stated in point 1.1, 
such a flexible, differentiated concept of forced marriage can prove useful as long as 
one upholds the starting point that compulsion is prohibited. It is difficult to agree upon 
an exact content of a definition of a forced marriage, the subjective element will vary 
from victim to victim, and it may also be require that the definition has a different 
concept in different situations. One must be stricter when applying provisions in the 
Penal Code than one has to be when declaring a marriage null and void. In regard to 
family reunification, it is possible that the increased stress the young women are 
subjected to simply by being in a country such as Pakistan may justify that the threshold 
of what constitutes a forced marriage must be even lower in these cases. What is evident 
is that the definition of forced marriages is at its widest when it comes to making use of 
non-legislative measures, cf. the definition of a forced marriage laid down by the 
working group.  
                                                 
174 Ot.prp. nr. 51 (2002/2003) [p.20] 
175 Conversation with Mr. Bjøranger  from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 13.06.03 
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6.10 Others 
Changing public opinions is a preventive measure that can be carried out through 
information campaigns that tells parents belonging to minority cultures about the laws 
and regulations of the countries, and that seeks to alter the parents’ opinion of how 
much influence their children shall have on their choice of spouse. In Norway one has 
distributed information to the minority cultures that one finds is practicing forced 
marriages by presenting information to participants in Norwegian language classes for 
adults, by talking to and cooperating with religious leaders, and by supporting voluntary 
organisations that work with minority groups and against forced marriages. Such 
measures have very few harmful effects. If the information is spread to the whole 
population and is very massive and evident in its form, one can risk stereotyping groups 
with minority backgrounds and giving rise to prejudice against such cultures for being 
inhuman in its practices for instance. Such stigmatisation could come in conflict with 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(the CERD), after which the State Parties are obligated to work against racial 
discrimination. According to article 7 of the CERD, the State Parties have to adopt 
measures in ‘the fields of teaching, education, culture and information’ in order to 
amongst other promote ‘understanding, tolerance and friendship among (…) racial or 
ethnical groups’. A broad national campaign against forced marriages can have the 
exact opposite effect if it labels whole minority groups as perpetrators of such crimes. 
But if the minority groups are identified and targeted directly, this can be done without 
attracting too much information from the mainstream society. It can also be perceived as 
positive that the minority cultures themselves (e.g represented by religious leaders and 
minority organisation) are working actively to extradite the phenomenon. The 
stigmatisation of minority groups at large will not so easily occur when mainstream 
society picks up that the minority groups themselves also are against this violation of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. Numerous scholars have pointed out that this 
line of action also is the most efficient way of dealing with unwanted practices in 
different cultures. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im stresses that internal discourse, i.e. 
working from within the culture, is essential when one wishes to obtain a goal that 
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descends from a cross cultural norm (in this case the norm that each individual shall 
have freedom, also in choosing a marriage)176.  
 
It is furthermore important to keep in mind that information campaigns like these have 
less harmful consequences towards an individual as a member of a group than a forced 
marriage will have on the victims. In such cases, when it has been documented that 
youths belonging to certain minority groups are at risk of being victims of forced 
marriages, the consideration of the victim must take precedence over the group’s 
possible interest in avoiding negative mentioning in the public. Besides, if this concerns 
a minority culture that more often than not practices forced marriages, it is not evident 
that this group has a deserving interest to be spared from negative publicity in the media 
and public.  
 
When it comes to more individually shaped preventive measures, it is important to have 
a good helping apparatus that youth in danger can turn to. Mediation services aimed at 
mediating in a conflict with parents and child can prove effective if both parties are 
willing to attend, and can be a good alternative before the conflict goes too far. As it is 
most practical to envision these services as voluntary, they will not be very intrusive 
and can therefore be a very good measure in the right cases.  
 
In other cases, where the will to reconcile is lacking, or the children do not dare to 
contact a mediator for help, there is a need for social services and child care services 
that can interact with schools and others in order to pick up on youths that possibly are 
in danger. In Norway, one has found that most forced marriages are entered into in the 
family’s country of origin. An important aim for the Government must then be to 
prevent the youths from being taken abroad as it is, jurisdiction-wise, much more 
difficult to prevent a marriage from happening abroad. In order to achieve this, it is 
important that schools are aware, as that may be the only tangent to mainstream society 
the youth at risk has, so that the schools can notify the appropriate social services. This 
presupposes that the schools have trained personnel that can identify a possible conflict 
                                                 
176 An-Naim, Ahmed Abdullahi: Ch.7 in Cook (1994) 
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and try to ‘nip it in the bud’. If not executed properly and with a necessary amount of 
sensitivity, such a procedure can easily be an extra burden to youths from minority 
cultures in the way that they feel questioned and interviewed and that their families 
wrongfully are being suspected of being potential criminals. It can also add fuel to the 
fire if there really is an emerging conflict between the child and its parents. 
 
It is very important when evaluating possible measures to keep in mind that it varies 
from family to family also within the minority cultures how one practices marriage. 
Arranged marriages are widespread in large parts of the world and this is a custom that 
many families in minority cultures practice without practicing forced marriages. As I 
have mentioned before, it is first when the marriage is involuntarily that it is illegal after 
international, as well as national, law. One must be careful so that one does not press all 
the norms of the majority culture down the heads of the members of minority cultures in 
a country. That will not only be undemocratic, but will also be in contradiction with the 
CERD. 
 
  
7 Pakistani Legislation/ Islamic Law 
Pakistan is an Islamic republic. This is embedded in the Constitution, which states that 
the spirit of the Constitution must be read in the light of Islam and that all laws are to be 
brought into consonance with the Qur’an and the Sunna.177 The Constitution contains a 
so-called ‘repugnancy clause’ stating that no laws ‘repugnant’ to the injunctions of 
Islam are to be enacted, cf. part IX of the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
177 Cf. article 2a which makes the preamble of the Constitution a part of its substantive provisions. 
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Pakistan inherited from British India a unified legal system and a complete hierarchy of 
courts when the country attained independence in 1947.178 The founder of Pakistan 
(Muhammad Ali Jinnah) did not envisage a theocracy, however religious and 
conservative forces demanded a clear expression and manifestation of the Islamic 
identity of the State of Pakistan.179 The two diverging opinions are mirrored in the 
Constitution, which opens for parallel judicial systems in the sense that it recognises 
religious law, (secular) colonial law and customary law, and the Shariat Court system 
that can determine whether a law is in conformity with the injunctions of Islam or 
not.180 
The parallel systems of law, and the focus on religious law can clearly be used to 
disadvantage of women, especially if a traditionalist version of Islam is allowed to 
influence the implementation of the law. In the Saima Waheed case, we find an example 
of how custom and a personal, traditionalist interpretation of religion almost prevailed 
over the laws (including the Shari’a) of Pakistan.  
 
When the Indian sub-continent was colonised by the British in the 19th century, the 
British modernised the legal system after a Western model in order to keep up with the 
changes brought about by political and economic developments. A new court system 
was also established. Family law was, however, left alone. It was not important to the 
colonisers how the population arranged their families, and at the same time it was 
extremely important to the Muslim point of view to uphold the Shari’a in this area. As 
the colonisation stopped at the threshold of the Muslim family, the women –who 
normally operated mostly within the sphere of the family, became important as the 
bearers of culture. Since a woman’s status is closely linked to her marriage, and to her 
behaviour as honourable, we see that it may be more important to influence or control 
who a woman marries, than a man. Combined with the duty of marriage, and the duty to 
help arranging marriages, these are mechanisms that may pull in the same direction, and 
constitute a pressure for the woman to enter into an unwanted marriage.  
                                                 
178 Ali/ Arif(1998) p.31 
179 Ali (2000), p.266 
180 For more on the parallel judicial systems in Pakistan, see: Ali,/Arif (1998) 
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There is no explicit protection of the right to marry in the Pakistani legislation, but such 
a right has been recognised by the courts (I will come back to two landmark cases 
further down). Furthermore, there are some provisions that provide protection against 
certain aspects of the practice of forced marriages. 
7.1 Rights Embedded in the Constitution 
The constitution of Pakistan guarantees many of the same rights that international 
human rights law ensure, and the reasons why these may be seen as offering safeguards 
against forced marriages are the same in both cases. In section 9 of the constitution it is 
stated that no person shall be deprived of the right to life and liberty, unless it is in 
accordance with law. Section 11 forbids slavery, forced labour and the like, its 
subparagraph 2 states that ‘[a]ll forms of forced labour and traffic in human beings are 
prohibited’. Section 14 sets forth the inviolability of dignity of man whereas section15 
protects the freedom of movement. All of these provisions may easily be violated in the 
grossest cases of forced marriages, where a young woman for instance is taken against 
her will and held in detention somewhere until the wedding. If the purpose of the 
marriage is to collect dower or to gain from it other benefits such as connections, it may 
also constitute trafficking in women. A life with a man the woman did not want to 
marry and the fact that she cannot get out of such a marriage, will easily amount to 
forced labour and slavery-like practice. If held against her will, either in the marriage or 
beforehand, the woman’s right to freedom of movement is violated. 
 
Section 25 ensures equality before the law, and gives equal protection by the law for all 
citizens, and section 25(2) states that there ‘shall be no discrimination on the basis of 
sex alone’. 
7.1.1 Writ Petitions for the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
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The constitution of Pakistan gives in section 199(1)(a) and (c) the High Courts authority 
to issue writs181. This means that the court can order officials182 of the state to refrain 
from doing anything they are not permitted to do or to do anything they are required by 
law to do. The court can furthermore declare that certain acts done and procedures taken 
have been done or taken without lawful authority and are of no lawful effect. The court 
also has the authority to order officials and government authorities to enforce any of the 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.  
 
Any aggrieved person can file writ petitions such as these. The court recognises the 
principles of public interest litigation, so that persons or organisations not directly 
affected by an alleged violation of fundamental rights also have standing to file a writ 
petition.183 It is an advantage for the female victim of a forced marriage that others, for 
instance NGO’s184, can act on her behalf in such stressful situations, where she may find 
herself to be in danger of being further victimised through ‘honour’ killing or other 
crimes. Still, INTERRIGHTS (The London-based International Centre for the Legal 
Protection of Human Rights) find that even though ‘such applications may provide a 
useful avenue to challenge the failure of state authorities to take necessary action to 
address aspects of forced marriage’, the resort to other remedies has in practice been 
more frequent. 185 
 
7.1.2 Habeas Corpus Petitions 
 
                                                 
181 A writ is defined as ‘a legal order issued by the authority [a court]and in the name of the state to do 
something therein mentioned -according to the Barron’s dictionary of legal terms, 1998, New York 
182 With official, I here mean a person that is performing functions in connection with the affairs of the 
republic 
183 Hossain/Turner p. 3. 
184 The abbreviation NGO stands for Non-Governmental Organisation 
185 Hossain/ Turner: p.3 
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A frequently used legal strategy in forced marriage cases in Pakistan where the woman 
is kept against her will in wait for the marriage or after the matrimony is the habeas 
corpus petition186. Such petitions can be brought before the High Courts. This can be 
done as a writ petition filed under section 199(1)(b) of the Constitution. This provision 
provides for the court to issue directions that ‘a person in custody [is to] be brought 
before it so that it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful 
authority or in an unlawful manner’. The petition can also be filed as a criminal 
miscellaneous petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, 
which states that the court may issue directions that any person ‘illegally or improperly 
detained in public or private custody be set at liberty’. This is, of course, provided that 
the custody is within the court’s jurisdiction. 
 
If such a petition is filed, the court may issue orders upon the respondents of the petition 
(that would usually be the woman’s parents or other family members) to bring her 
before the court so that the judges may examine whether she is held in unlawful 
custody. This gives the court the opportunity to question the woman, in open court or in 
chambers, to make sure that she is not involuntarily kept in custody.187  
 
The petition may be initiated by the victim, but it may also be filed by any other person, 
such as a friend, a relative, or a person or organisation acting in the public interest. The 
governments of other nations also have the opportunity to engage Pakistani lawyers to 
act on their behalf. The British Government uses to a certain extent the Pakistani legal 
system to solve cases where the English citizen is detained by her family somewhere in 
Pakistan. So far lawyers from Pakistani NGO’s representing the British High 
Commission in Islamabad have pleaded 7 cases before the High Court.188 This may 
provide a helpful measure for the Norwegian Government as well.  See point 5.6 on 
family reunification.  
                                                 
186 Habeas corpus is ‘a procedure for obtaining a judicial determination of the legality of an individual’s 
custody’ -according to the Barron’s dictionary of legal terms, 1998, New York 
187 Hossain/Turner p.6 
188Report, study trip  
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It is a considerable advantage that anyone may file a petition, since the victim herself 
may not always be in position to file such a complaint. Victims held in unlawful 
detention in connection with forced marriages may find themselves constantly watched, 
without money, passport or access to a phone. The victims may also in the most extreme 
cases face the threats of ‘honour’ killing.189 And, as it is mostly family members that 
would be detaining her, it may be emotionally difficult for the woman to bring the case 
before the court. A habeas corpus petition is not punitive in character, and will thus 
have less severe consequences for the perpetrators and through that also for the victim 
than if the family was to be prosecuted for the crime. Hossain and Turner state that  
 
‘[g]iven the difficulties of obtaining evidence from the woman, due to a combination of family pressure, 
fear of reprisals from the family or repercussions upon them, a non-punitive approach is often found to be 
the most effective means of ensuring her recovery and release.’ 190 
 
A habeas corpus petition is ideal in this context as it aims simply at bringing the woman 
concerned before the court, and at getting her released from possible detention.  
 
In some cases the filing of habeas corpus petitions has constituted a clear breach of the 
intentions behind the law. This was the case in the Saima Waheed case, where the 
parents of the Saima Waheed filed a petition against her lawyer, Asma Jahangir, on the 
grounds that she was responsible for detaining their daughter in a shelter home.191 
However, the petition was struck by the courts, which stated that Ms. Jahangir did not 
detain her. 
7.2 Criminal Law 
The Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance of 1979 section 11 criminalises the 
abduction for the purpose of forced marriage. Offences committed in connection with 
                                                 
189  Hossain/Turner, p. 1 
190 Hossain/Turner, p. 3 
191 Abduhl Waheed v Asma Jahangir, PLD 1997 Lahore 331 
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forced marriages may also -in extreme cases- lead to prosecution. This is the case of 
offences like murder and rape. Slavery is prohibited subsequent to sections 370-371 of 
the Penal Code of 1860. The Penal Code of 1860 also prohibits wrongful confinement. 
Sections 365 prohibits the kidnapping or abduction with intent to secretly or wrongfully 
confine a person, whereas Penal Code provision 368 concerns the wrongful concealing 
or keeping in confinement of a kidnapped or abducted person. 
 
According to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 section 100 a magistrate who 
‘has reason to believe that any person is confined under such circumstance that the 
confinement amounts to an offence (…) [can] issue a search warrant’ to locate the 
‘missing’ person. The individual the search warrant is directed to may then search for 
the confined person according to the provisions set forth in the said warrant. If the 
confined person is found, she ‘shall immediately be taken before a Magistrate, who 
shall make such order as in the circumstances of the case seem proper’. The courts 
furthermore have the authority to direct that certain categories of individuals shall be 
held in ‘protective custody’. Witnesses and victims of crimes of sexual violence are 
included in these categories.192 This measure may thus provide remedy for victims (or 
witnesses, for that matter) of forced marriages in grave cases. 
 
Although the intent of criminal provisions is to provide effective redress to women who 
are victims of forced marriages, there appear to have been few or no instances of 
persons being prosecuted in relation to forced or threatened forced marriages.193  
INTERRIGHTS states that the laws meant to protect the women have instead been used 
against them. Reported cases indicate that families of women who have succeeded in 
evading forced marriages and contracting marriages contrary to the family’s wishes, 
have resorted to filing false charges of bigamy or zina(adultery194) against the women 
                                                 
192 Hossain/Turner, p.4 
193 Hossain/Turner, p.4 
194 According to islam, zina or adultery is defined as any sexual contact outside a marriage. 
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and charges of kidnapping, abduction and rape against their husbands.195 This happened 
for instance in the Humaira-case that I am discussing below.196  
7.3 Islamic Law 
The family law is governed by the religious laws of Islam. In order to understand the 
judicial system of Pakistan it is thus important to have some knowledge of on Islam and 
Islamic law. 
 
7.3.1 The Religion of Islam 
Islam is a religion that permeates every aspect of the lives of those who profess to it. It 
combines religion, law and morality, and provides guidance and regulates a wide range 
of matters concerning a Muslim’s life, in public as well as private matters (Islam does 
not initially recognise any boundary between the private and public sphere, or between 
society and religion. Everything is regarded a whole.197). It does not only prescribe 
moral values and religious rites, but regulates quite specifically what a Muslim shall and 
shall not do down to the very details of good manners and hygiene198. Islam 
consequentially comes with its own legal system.  
 
The sacred law of Islam is called Shari’a –which means ‘the right path’ in Arabic, 
referring to the path man must choose to find Allah (God). Shari’a is one of the oldest 
legal systems we know, and it is still active and in use, regulating and affecting the lives 
of between 600-800 million people.199 Shari’a is universal, in the sense that it is 
supposed to apply to all Muslims, regardless of where they live, and uniform, since 
there is only one will –the will of Allah- that is expressed in the law.200 The universality 
                                                 
195 Hossain/Turner, p.4 
196 Humaira Mahmood v Malik Moazzam Ghayas Khokar, PLD 1999 Lahore 273 
197 Dahl (1997) p. 6 
198 An-Naim (1990) p. 11 
199 Warberg (1993)p. 262 
200 Dahl (1997) p.12. 
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of Islam and Shari’a is important to take into account in the engineering of measures 
against forced marriages occurring amongst some Muslim immigrants in Western 
countries. A Muslim will, of course, have to be bound by the laws of the country he/she 
lives in, but will at the same time feel bound by Islam, and in that sense have a double 
set of norms regulating his/her behaviour. I will argue that in order to achieve an 
effective result, the measures cannot be of a sort that will force the Muslim to abandon 
his/her Muslim identity. I will come back to this later, in the discussion of measures in 
Norway. 
 
7.3.2 The Sources of Law of the Shari’a 
The religious, legal and moral code of the Shari’a has appeared through divine 
revelations and has been interpreted through the traditionally recognised sources of law, 
namely the Qur’an and the Sunna. The Qur’an is regarded as the revelation of Allah and 
is seen as a sacred text. The Sunna contains the statements, sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet Muhammad. A single statement/decision deriving from Muhammad is called a 
hadith. It is the hadiths that together with other stories of the prophet’s life which 
constitute the Sunna. The number of hadiths is very high, and there are several 
collections of hadiths. The two hadith-collections regarded as particularly authorised are 
the collections of al-Bukhari and al-Muslim. 
 
The interpretation or the aforementioned sources of law has taken place by using the 
legal techniques of quias and ijma. Quias is analogical reasoning, and is most often 
regarded as a restricted form of ijtihad. Ijtihad means ‘self-exertion’ and describes a 
procedure of personal reasoning or interpretation of the Shari’a. The practice of ijtihad 
has not been in use for several centuries201, but Muslim scholars advocating reform of 
the Shari’a have opened for a renewed use of the procedure. Ijma is ‘the unanimous 
agreement between jurists of a particular age on a specific issue’202, i.e. established 
                                                 
201 For further reading on ‘the closing of the gate of ijtihad’, see for instance:  Esposito(1982) p.11 or 
Warberg(1993), p.267 and following. 
202 Esposito(1982) p. 7 
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consensus upon the issue. It is common to refer to both quias and ijma as sources of law 
in addition to the two textual sources203.204 
 
Shari’a is, as mentioned earlier, a uniform system of law. Still, there are ambiguities to 
be found in the sources of the Shari’a, and the content of the law has been established 
on the basis of  interpretation. This has lead to disagreements concerning principles of 
interpretation, which again has given rise to the forming of different schools of thought 
within Islam. The Sunni Muslims are divided into four schools of law, namely Hanafi, 
Shafei, Mailiki and Hanbali, whereas the Shias have the three subdivisions of Ismalia, 
Athna-Asharia and Zaidya. The vast majority of Pakistani Muslims are Sunni, 
belonging to the Hanafi school of law. 205 I will therefore focus mainly on what this 
school of thought is saying. 206 
 
7.4 Islamic Family Law in Pakistan 
Family law is one of the main areas in the Shari’a. The notion of family has a special 
place in the Islamic religion (it was, for example, the family that was the instrument 
when the first Muslim community was founded in Medina207 -as Mohammad’s wife 
became the first Muslim), and the institution of marriage is thus extremely important. It 
is considered a duty for every Muslim man and woman to marry, unless they are 
physically or financially unable to enter marriage.208  In accordance with this duty, it is 
also a norm that one has to help arranging a marriage for close members of the family 
and friends.209 Marriage is seen as an important safeguard of chastity, and central to the 
                                                 
203 See for instance: Esposito (1982)  p.3 and following. 
204 For more information on the sources of law, see for instance: Dahl(1997) chapter 2 
205 Ali, Shaheen Sardar (1996) p. 164 
206 For more information on the Sunni schools of law, see for instance: Dahl (1997) p. 11 and following. 
207Dahl (1997) p.  49 
208 The Qur’an 24.32, Esposito(1982) p. 15 
209 Dahl(1997) p. 50 
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growth and stability of the basic unit of society, the Muslim family, through which the 
Muslim community is upheld and spread.210  
 
7.5 Marriage 
Marriage (nikah) is regarded as a religious sacred covenant in the sense that it is the way 
of realising the essence of Islam. There is widespread agreement among all major 
writers on Islamic law upon the fact that marriage in Islam is a civil contract, and 
therefore all requisites of a valid contract must be fulfilled.211 In order for the marriage 
to be valid, the two parties to the contract must have capacity. Every adult Muslim of 
sound mind has such legal capacity to contract a valid marriage for him or herself, and a 
marriage cannot be brought about without the consent of both parties to the 
matrimony.212   
 
According to the Hanafi school of law, a woman can quite autonomously decide 
whether she will marry. It seems to be disputed how the other Sunni schools regard this 
question. Tove Stang Dahl claims, with reference to Coulson, that all of the major Sunni 
schools of law agree that a woman cannot be married off against her own will, but that 
the three other schools demand cooperation from her guardian in signing the contract,213 
whereas Sardar Ali claims with reference to Hamilton that the other schools ‘assert that 
a woman can not contract herself in marriage to a man, either with or without the 
consent of her guardians’.214 
 
                                                 
210 Esposito(1982) p. 15 
211 Ali, Shaheen Sardar(1996)p.157 
212 Esposito (1982) p. 16 
For hadiths supporting this view, see Bjøranger Terje (2000), p.105-106 and the internet site found 
(14.06.03): http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/hadith/had23.htm 
213 Dahl (1997) p. 67 
214 Ali(1996) p. 166 
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A separation is thus being made between the girl’s right to choose her spouse freely and 
the right she has to refuse a marriage arranged by her parents. There seems to be more 
of a consensus concerning the latter point –freedom from direct force- than as regards 
the former case. It is only if the latter right is denied that we may talk about a forced 
marriage. In the first case, it will be the woman’s right to marry whoever she pleases 
that is violated. The two rights are of course entwined, both being part of the right to 
self-determination and liberty, as well as ensuring two different aspects of the right to 
marry. As it will extend the scope of this thesis to look at all the different interpretations 
of the different schools of thought, I will not go into the matter in any further detail, but 
concentrate on the school of law relevant to Pakisitan, namely the Hanafi school of law. 
 
7.5.1 Consent 
The majority of people in Pakistan are, as previously mentioned, Hanafi Muslims, and 
the rule of full consent therefore applies.215 The judiciary in Pakistan has in two 
different cases upheld that a woman’s consent is a requisite for marriage.  
 
In the Saima Waheed case216, were the woman had married someone against the will of 
her parents, the father reopened a debate one had thought was settled for centuries 
among Hanafi Sunni Muslims, when he claimed that the approval of the guardian (wali) 
was a main condition of a valid marriage. The father of Saima Waheed accused her 
husband of kidnapping and adultery (zina). The court rejected this notion (though 
dissentingly) and upheld that a marriage without the consent of the wali was still valid. 
The dissenting judge (Ihsan-l-haq Chaudray) did, however, raise some concern among 
women advocates in Pakistan. Making no use of the sources of law available to him 
(such as the Constitution etc. as mentioned above) he stated that although the full and 
free consent of a woman forms an essential element of a valid marriage, a marriage 
must also have the consent of the wali in order for it to be valid. The case has been 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The married couple are now living in hiding in 
                                                 
215 Bjøranger(2002) p. 71 
216 Abduhl Waheed v Asma Jahangir, PLD 1997 Lahore 331  
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Norway.217 Shaheen Sardar Ali has in her article on the case argued that ‘the concept of 
a wali (male guardian) being required to be present at the contracting of marriage is a 
result of the socially constructed gender roles existing since times immemorial’.218  
 
The judgement in the next landmark case on forced marriages in Pakistan seems to 
support Ms. Ali’s standing. In the Humaira-case, a 30-year-old woman refused to marry 
the man of her father’s choice, and married someone else instead. The woman was then 
taken by her father and forced to participate in a mock wedding, which was videotaped 
to serve as proof. The fake husband reported that she was abducted by her real husband, 
and both the woman and her real husband were charged with the crime of adultery 
(zina). The High Court of Lahore exposed the videotaped wedding as mock, and held 
that: 
 
‘In matters of marriage a woman was given equal right [by Islam] to choose her life partner (…). 
Unfortunately, in our practical lives, we are influenced by a host of other prejudices bequeathed by 
history, tradition and feudalism (…). It is that culture that needs to be tamed by law and an objective 
understanding and the Islamic values (…). Male chauvinism, feudal bias and compulsions of a conceited 
ego should not be confused with Islamic values. An enlightened approach is called for.’219 
 
7.5.2 Nullity of the Marriage as a Consequence of the Lack of Consent from 
Both Parties 
Consent is therefore a condition for a valid marriage according to Islam, and thus also 
according to the law of Pakistan. The consent may be explicitly given, but it is 
considered sufficient that the woman does not protest. Without the consent of both 
parties, the marriage will be void (batil).220 This means that the marriage will have no 
legal effect after the law; it will be regarded as if it had never been entered into. It will 
                                                 
217 Aftenposten 05.02.02, p. 6 
218 Ali, Shaheen Sardar, p. 174 
219 Humaira Mahmood v Malik Moazzam Ghayas Khokar, PLD 1999 Lahore 273 
220 Ali(1996) p. 158 
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establish no civil rights or obligations between the parties and children of the marriage 
will be regarded illegitimate.221 
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
Pakistan cannot be said to fulfil its obligation after the CEDAW to abolish customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination against women (cf. article 2 litra f), to take all 
appropriate measures to end practices based on the idea of the inferiority to women or 
on ‘stereotyped roles for men and women’ (cf. article 5 litra a) and ensuring the same 
right to freely choose a spouse. The Saima Waheed case serves as an example of this: 
Although the High Court eventually established that a grown Muslim woman is sui juris 
in relation to marriage, Saima and her husband were not granted sufficient protection by 
the Government and had to move from Pakistan in fear of their lives. 
 
However, being as it may that Pakistan cannot protect women against forced marriages 
de facto, the laws are there granting (at least some of aspects of forced marriages) 
protection de jure. It would be possible to make use of habeas corpus or writ petitions, 
as the British High Commission has done in some cases, to get the victims back to 
Norway, where the legal system is better equipped to deal with the consequences of 
forced marriages. Effective remedy and help can also be provided, and if worst comes to 
worst, the woman will have a support apparatus at hand if she has to break contact with 
her family. 
 
It is furthermore clear that Islam does not allow marriages without the consent of both 
the indenting spouses. The practice of forced marriages is thus rooted in culture and a 
traditionalist viewpoint that has nothing to do with real Islam. Communication of the 
fact that Islamic law, Pakistani legislation, Norwegian legislation and international 
human rights all pull in the same direction forming a universal, cross-cultural norm is 
thus essential in combating the practice of forced marriages. 
                                                 
221 Ali(1996) p. 160 
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7.7 Cross-Cultural Norms/Internal Discourse in Forced Marriage Cases 
Hennum /Paul state in their report on the legislation against forced marriages and 
bigamy (to the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development) that the 
problem is not primarily that there is a lack of provisions regulating forced marriages, 
but that it can be a problem that the content of these provisions are not known to the 
public.222 When it comes to the minority population from Pakistan, it is also very 
important to keep in mind that they, as Muslims, have to apply the law of Shari’a as 
well.  
 
The internal discourse might take the form of information campaigns showing how 
forced marriages are contrary to their own religion. In order to prevent forced marriages 
from happening, it is my belief that the Norwegian authorities must address the parents 
who uphold such practices. They come from an extremely conservative part of the 
country and many are illiterate and frequently get more conservative in meeting with the 
liberal West, in fear of loosing their own culture and control over their children. The 
‘Islamic card’ must be played out. Just informing them of Norwegian legislation is not 
enough, one has to work with their identities as Muslims, and show that forced 
marriages are contrary to their religion. This has to be done in a culture sensitive way by 
members of their own group, so as not to alienate them. This can be done through 
NGOs in the minority groups, for instance. An important measure will be education, 
where exchange of knowledge showing them less alarming sides of the Norwegian 
society is a good means to enhance understanding. Legal provisions in Norway can be 
an effective remedy to oppose pressure from the family in Pakistan. The legislation will 
work together with Islam and international law, all pulling in the same direction 
especially if one succeeds in establishing an internal discourse on the cross-cultural 
norm of freedom to choose in relation to marriage. 
                                                 
222 Hennum/Paul (2000), p. 41 
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8 Conclusion 
In this thesis I set out to look at aspects of forced marriages from a human rights and 
women’s rights perspective, trying to show how the practice is particularly harmful to 
women, and that states are under an obligation to work to prevent forced marriages in a 
number of  ways. It is my opinion that working to prevent forced marriages best can be 
done through a combination of informing the perpetrators of Norwegian legislation and 
taking into account their Muslim identities and –in culture sensitive way- showing them 
that forced marriages are contrary to their religion. The Islamic argument should be 
used more actively when working to change attitudes in the Pakistani population. 
 
Furthermore, I have further attempted to show that it can be useful to operate with a 
differentiated content of the term forced marriages, as the needs of the victims may vary 
from situation to situation. When it comes to applying the term forced marriages in 
relation to the Penal code, considerations of foreseeability and legal safeguards must be 
more in the foreground than when it comes to annulling a forced marriage or denying 
family reunification on the basis of forced marriages. Such a differentiated notion may 
be difficult to relate to, but as long as the assessment of what constitutes a forced 
marriage always will contain subjective elements relating to the victim, it may be an 
advantage that the notion is flexible (note, however: never in a culture relativistic 
manner-the cross-cultural norm that forced marriages are illegal must form the basis of 
the term at all times) and can be adjusted to the victims needs.  
 
It has been important for me to point out that religion and culture should not serve as an 
excuse for upholding clearly damaging practices, and I have shown that in the case of 
forced marriages and the Pakistani population in Norway, there is no religious support 
for the practice either.  
 
One of the problems in addressing new measures in regards to forced marriages is the 
lack of statistics. There may be a need for differential treatment, but as long as no 
statistics show the scope of the problem, it will be difficult to evaluate whether the 
differential measures taken are proportionate with what one hopes to accomplish. Can 
one, for instance, introduce a minimum age limit of 25 for family reunification between 
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spouses as Hege Storhaug has suggested?223 If this were to be introduced for the whole 
population, there would be no proportionality between the measure taken and what one 
wishes to accomplish, since there are so few forced marriages in the Norwegian 
population as a whole. But the case may be different if one through statistics finds 
evidence that an overwhelmingly large percentage of one minority group practices 
transnational forced marriages. Differential treatment always has to be justifiable, and 
as mentioned before, there has to be proportionality between the means and the ends. I 
am not saying that an age limit targeted at special groups would be unproblematic. 
Muslims are for instance urged by their religion to marry young, and such a measure 
may be too invasive in their religious faith. But if statistics are provided, it would be 
easier to raise a discussion over what measures to take. The CEDAW Committee 
requested Norway to conduct research into the stereotypical cultural attitudes prevailing 
in Norway and urged the Government to take effective measures to eliminate 
discrimination against minority women and to intensify its efforts to address the issue of 
violence against women in their consideration of Norway’s 5th and 6th periodic report. 
 
It might also be interesting to see how Norway defines forced marriage in relation to 
asylum seekers. I have no access to current practice on this area, but statements in the 
Basrat verdict224 may indicate a difference in practice mat be found in such cases. The 
court agreed with the State that one should be careful in letting such a widespread 
cultural phenomenon as forced marriages give status as a refugee and a right to asylum. 
If this is the prevailing Government view, there may be reason to investigate whether 
such a view will affect women to a larger degree than men, as women subjected to 
violence is a world wide problem. Forced marriages infringe deeply on the right to 
liberty and many other human rights (see chapter 3). Can it really be a valid argument in 
consistency with the CEDAW that female victims of forced marriages or other kinds of 
violence cannot be given status as refugees because there are so many of them in the 
same situation? It is beyond the scope of the present study to investigate the matter but 
it seems that this is an area that needs looking into by immigration and legal authorities. 
                                                 
223 Aftenposten, 15th December 1998 
224 Case no. 00-03920 A/86 from Oslo City Court (byrett) of 06th of October 2000 
  108 
 
 
 
  109 
9 Literature 
 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar ‘Excerpts’ in Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International 
Law. Equal before Allah, Unequal before Man?’ Kluwer Law International,2000, p.218-
237 and 277-285 
 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar and Arif, Kamran: ‘Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan and 
Consequences for Human Rights’ in (ed.) Shaheed, F., Warraich et al.: ‘Shapin 
Women’s Lives. Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan’, Shirgat Gah, 1998 p. 29-60 
 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar, Is an Adult Muslim Woman Sui Juris? Some Reflections on the 
Concept of “Consent in Marriage” without a Wali (with Particular Reference to the 
Saima Waheed Case), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, Vol. 3, 1996, 
 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar: ‘Application of Operative Islamic Law in the Context of 
International Human Rights: The Case of Pakistan’s Ratification of the Women’s 
Convention’ in ‘Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law. Equal 
Before Allah, Unequal Before Man?’, Kluwer Las International, 2000, p. 265-275 on p. 
266 
 
Andenæs, Johs (1997):,p. 143 ‘Alminnelig strafferett’, 4th edition, Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, 1997, p. 143. 
 
Andenæs, Johs and Bratholm, Anders: ’Spesiell strafferett. Utvalgte emner’ 3rd edition, 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1996 
 
  110 
An-Na’im, Abdullahi, ‘Ch.7: State Responsibility Under International Human Rights 
Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws’ in Cook, Rebecca J. (ed):‘Human 
Rights for Women. National and International Perspectives’, University of Pennsylvanie 
Press (1994) p. 167-188 
 
An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed, Toward an Islamic Reformation –Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights, and International Law, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1990 
 
Barron’s dictionary of legal terms, 1998, New York 
 
Bjøranger, Terje: ‘Islams rett –oversikt’, unpublished, Løvenstad, 2002. The book can 
be ordered at: tbj@udi.no 
 
Bratholm, Anders and Matningsdal, Magnus (ed.): ‘Straffeloven med kommentarer. 
Anden Del. Forbrytelser.’, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1995 p. 512 
 
Bredal, Anja, Arrangerte ekteskap og tvangsekteskap blant ungdom med 
innvandrerbakgrunn, Kompetansesenter for likestilling, Oslo, 1998 
 
Buergenthal, Human Rights in a Nutshell, West Law School, 2002 
 
Cook, Rebecca J., ‘State Accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms on Discrimination against Women’ in Human Rights for Women:National and 
International Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelfia, 1994, p.228-
256 
 
Craig, Ronald L.: ‘Stor norsk-engelsk juridisk ordbok’, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1999 
 
Dahl, Tove Stang, The Muslim Family, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1997 
  111 
 
Eckhoff, Torstein and Helgesen, Jan E.: ‘Rettskildelære’, 4th ed, Tano Aschehoug, 
Oslo, 1997 
 
Esposito, John L., Women in Muslim Familiy Law,(Syracuse), New York, 1982 
 
Fangen, Katrine, Tvangsekteskap. En evaluering av mottiltakene, Oslo, 2002 
 
Hellum, Anne, Women’s Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa -Mixed Norms 
and Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe, Oslo, 1999 
 
Hennum, Ragnhild and Paul, Rachel: ’Lovgivning mot tvangsekteskap og bigami’, 
stensilserien no. 92, Institutt for Kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo, 2000, 
 
Holmøy, Vera and  Lødrup,Peter: ‘Ekteskapsloven og enkelte andre lover med 
kommentarer’, 2nd ed., Gyldendal, Oslo, 2001 
 
Holmøy, Vera og Lødrup, Peter, Ekteskapsloven –og enkelte andre lover med 
kommentarer, 2.utg.,  Oslo 2001 
 
Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion document): Forslag til endringer i ekteskapsloven 
om inngåelse og oppløsning av ekteskap (lov 4.juli 1991 nr. 47 om ekteskap), June 
2002, by the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs  
 
Andenaes, Johannes: ‘The General Part of the Criminal Law of Norway’, New York 
University Press, New York, (1965) Volume Three 
 
Lundgaard, Hans Petter: ‘Gaarders innføring i internasjonal privatrett’, 3rd ed., 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2000 
  112 
 
Matnigsdal, Magnus in Norsk Lovkommentar, 4.ed, Gyldendal, Oslo, 2002, volume 1, 
 
Nussbaum (1999), Martha, Women and Equality: The Capabilities Approach, 
International Labour Review, ILO, no. 138(3), 1999 
 
Okin, Susan Moller, with respondents, Princeton University Press, Princeton (1999) 
Cohen, Howard,  Nussbaum ’ Introduction Feminism, Multiculturalism, and 
Human Equality’ in Okin 
Parekh, Bhikhu, ‘A Varied Moral World,’ in Okin  
Pollitt, Katha, Whose Culture? in Okin  
Tamir, Yael, Siding With the Underdogs, in Okin  
Kymlicka, Will, Liberal Complacencies, in Okin  
Raz, Joseph, How Perfect Should One Be? And Whose Culture Is? in Okin 
Nussbaum, Martha C., A Plea for Difficulty, in Okin 
 
 
Ragnhild and Paul, Rachel: ’Lovgivning mot tvangsekteskap og bigami’, stensilserien 
no. 92, Institutt for Kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo, 2000 
 
Report from a study trip made by Norwegian representatives from Oslo Red Cross 
International Centre, Oslo Police District, the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 
and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration from the 6th to the 19th of December 
2002 
 
Ruud, Morten and  Ulfstein, Geir, ’Innføring i Folkerett’, 2. ed, Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, 2002 
 
  113 
Ruud, Morten,  Ulfstein, Geir and Fauchald, Ole Kristian: ’Utvalgte emner i folkerett’, 
Tano Aschehoug, Oslo 1997 
 
Slettan, Svein and Øie, Toril Marie: ’Forbrytelse og straff. Lærebok i strafferett’, Tano 
Aschehoug, Oslo, 1997 
 
Thue, Helge J.: ’Internasjonal person-, familie- og arverett. Alminnelige prinsipper og 
de enkelte reguleringer.’, Oslo, 2001 
 
Vassenden, Kåre(red.) Innvandrere i Norge. Hvem er de, hva gjør de og hvordan lever 
de? Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå. 1997 
 
Warberg, Lasse A., ’Shari’a: Om den islamske strafferetten (Uqûbât)’ , i Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab, København: De nordiske kriminalistforeninger 1993, 
p. 262 
 
Wikan, Unni:’Mot en ny norsk underklasse.’ Gyldendal forlag,Oslo, 1995 
 
Sources read, but not quoted from:  
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition, Oxford, 1998 
 
Henre J. Steiner, International Human Rights in Context –Law, Politics, Morals, 
Oxford, 2000 
 
Kaur, Lavleen, ”Arrangert ekteskap –Tvang eller Kultur?” Mellomfagsoppgave i 
Kriminologi, Oslo, 1999 
 
Meron, Theodor, Human Rights in International Law –Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford, 
1984 
  114 
 
Møse, Erik, Menneskerettigheter, Oslo, 2002 
 
Schiratzki, Johanna, Muslimsk familjerätt –i svenskt perspektiv, 2.opplag, Stockholm, 
2001 
 
 
Literature found at the internet: 
 
Follow-up document ‘Efforts against forced marriages spring 2002’/ 
oppfølgingsdokumentet “Innsats mot tvangsekteskap våren 2002” found 10.06.03 at the 
internet: 
http://odin.dep.no/bfd/norsk/publ/handlingsplaner/004021-990048/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
 
Handlingsplan mot tvangsekteskap (‘Plan of Action against Forced Marriages’). Found 
on the internet (16.06.03): http://odin.dep.no/bfd/norsk/publ/handlingsplaner/004021-
990047/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
 
Fact sheet from the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. found on the internet 
(12.06.03): http://www.udi.no/dokumenter/pdf/Faktaark/VisumEngelsk%202.pdf 
 
‘A choice by right’, the report of the Working Group on Forced Marriage, found 
(04.06.03) on the internet: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/frcdmrgs.pdf 
 
Storhaug, Hege: ’Tvangsekteskap-en kriseguide’.Found at internet (15.06.03): 
http://www.seif.no/tvangsekteskap/kriseguide/index.html#01 
 
  115 
The Centre for Combating Ethnic Discrimination, Comments to Green Paper. Can be 
found at internet (11.06.03): http://www.smed.no/artikkelID.asp?artikkelID=202 
 
Hossain, Sara and Turner, Suzanne, ‘Abduction for Forced Marriage – Rights and 
Remedies in Bangladesh and Pakistan’, the International Centre for the Legal Protection 
of Human Rights (INTERRIGHTS), found at the internet (15.06.03): 
http://www2.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/FMarticleHossain.pdf 
 
 
Hadiths: internet site found (14.06.03): http://www.sacred-
texts.com/isl/hadith/had23.htm 
  
 
Høringsnotat (green paper/discussion paper): ’Forslag til endringer i 
utlendingsforskriften §§ 25 annet, tredje og fjerde ledd og 19 femte ledd’, April 2003, 
the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. Found at 
internet(14.06.03): 
http://www.odin.dep.no/krd/norsk/aktuelt/p10000282/p10000283/016081-
080016/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
 
 
Translation of Norwegian laws (English):  
 
 
The Norwegian Constitution: 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
 
General Civil Penal Code (16.06.03): 
  116 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.doc 
 
The Marriage Act (16.03.03): 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19910704-047-eng.pdf 
 
The Immigration Act (16.06.03): 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19880624-064-eng.doc 
 
Immigration regulations: (12.06.03):  
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/for-19901221-1028-eng.doc 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Lister over tabeller, figurer m v 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
